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INTRODUCTION

In the past, federal law has been relatively clear that an administrative body vested with authority to issue rules and to adjudicate individual cases may develop its law through either means, so long as Congress has not specified otherwise and the agency does not abuse its
discretion. 1 This means that federal law has not generally required
agencies, as soon as feasible and to the extent practicable, to elaborate
agency law by rule in rulemaking proceedings. Most states have followed federal law in this regard. However, the courts of a number of
states and recent model state legislation are moving in a different direction. They appear to be in the process of establishing a mandatory gen• Copyright 1988 by Arthur Earl Bonfield. This paper was presented at the Western States
Seminar on State & Local Administrative Law, sponsored by the BYU Journal of Public Law, on
January 21, 1988.
•• John Murray Professor, University of Iowa Law School
1. See infra Section II.
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era! preference for the elaboration of state agency law by rule rather
than by ad hoc order. 2
This article will explore the growing movement to impose a legally binding preference for rulemaking as the primary means of state
agency lawmaking. The present effort will begin with a description of
the widely established view that absent specific legislation to the contrary, agencies vested with authority to issue rules and to decide individual cases have broad discretion to choose the procedural
means-rulemaking or adjudication-by which they make their law.
That will be followed by an analysis of the reasons why and the extent
to which a preference for state agency lawmaking by rule is desirable,
and the reasons why such a preference for this particular means of
agency lawmaking is especially justifiable in state government as compared to the federal government. An examination of the decisions of
several state courts will then reveal the basis and scope of a judicially
mandated preference for state agency lawmaking by rule in the absence
of statutes explicitly requiring that result. Finally, legislative proposals
calculated to impose on state agencies a general duty to elaborate their
law primarily through rulemaking will be examined in light of objections to such a statutory innovation.
This article concludes that a binding general preference for state
agency lawmaking by rule rather than by ad hoc order is both desirable
and feasible, so long as that general preference is subject to a rule of
reason. It also concludes that general statutory provisions on this subject should be adopted by the several states and that, in the absence of
such provisions, state courts would be fully justified in imposing on
agencies in specified circumstances a binding general preference for administrative lawmaking by rule.
II.

STATE AGENCY DISCRETION To DETERMINE

ITs

LAwMAKING

MoDALITY: THE DoMINANT VIEW

State legislatures ordinarily delegate express or implied authority
to their agencies to issue rules after rulemaking proceedings and to issue orders after adjudicatory proceedings. As a result, legislative delegations enable agencies to elaborate agency law in a form - rules -that
resembles statutes, and also in a form - orders - that resembles the
case-by-case, common-law precedents of courts. That is, administrative
agencies are typically authorized to make their law by directly binding
prescriptive statements of general applicability in rulemaking and by
individual decisions of particular applicability in adjudication which
2. See infra Sections IV and V.
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serve as precedent for future cases. Since agencies are usually authorized to use these two different procedural modalities as means by which
to elaborate their law, they must inevitably choose, in particular situations, to do so by rule, by ad hoc order, or by both. The scope of their
discretion to utilize, for this purpose, one modality rather than the
other, therefore, becomes significant.
To understand the dominant state view concerning agency discretion to choose the means by which it makes law one must first understand federal law on this subject. The reason for this is that most states
have uncritically adopted for their own use in this area analogous federal law, usually citing one or more of three principal United States
Supreme Court cases on this subject as precedents for their action. As a
result, a brief description of these federal cases follows.
The first, and probably most widely cited federal case dealing with
the freedom of agencies to choose the means by which they make their
law is SEC v. Chenery Corp. 3 This case involved an SEC decision
holding that certain corporate insiders could not profit from trading in
the stock of their corporation while it was in the process of reorganization. The agency based its determination on the Public Utility Holding
Company Act. The insiders insisted that if the SEC desired to prohibit
such conduct it could do so only by issuing a rule that was prospective
in nature and that prohibited insider profiteering of the specific type in
question.
The United States Supreme Court disagreed, refusing "to say that
the Commission, which had not previously been confronted with the
problem of management trading during reorganization, was forbidden
from utilizing this particular [adjudicatory] proceeding for announcing
and applying a new standard of conduct." 4 Indeed, the Court stressed
that there was a clear place for agency lawmaking on a case-by-case
basis, and that "the choice made between proceeding by general rule or
by individual ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed
discretion of the administrative agency." 11 The Court explained the reasons for its decision in this way:
To hold that the Commission had no alternative in this proceeding but to approve the proposed transaction, while formulating any
general rules it might desire for use in future cases of this nature,
would be to stultify the administrative process. That we refuse to do.
Since the Commission, unlike a court, does have the ability to
make new law prospectively through the exercise of its rule-making
3. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
4. Id. at 203.

5. Id.
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powers, it has less reason to rely upon ad hoc adjudication to formulate new standards of conduct within the framework of the Holding
Company Act. The function of filling in the interstices of the Act
should be performed, as much as possible, through this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the future. But any rigid
requirement to that effect would make the administrative process inflexible and incapable of dealing with many of the specialized
problems which arise .... Not every principle essential to the effective
administration of a statute can or should be cast immediately into the
mold of a general rule. Some principles must await their own development, while others must be adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable situations. In performing its important functions in these respects, therefore, an administrative agency must be equipped to act
either by general rule or by individual order. To insist upon one form
of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity. 6

In the second principal case on this subject, the United States Supreme Court was faced with a challenge to the validity of an NLRB
order requiring an employer to furnish a union, prior to a collective
bargaining election, a list of the names and addresses of its employees.
The order was based on an earlier NLRB decision requiring employers
to provide such lists; but the earlier agency decision was prospective
only, because it did not apply the requirement to the parties in that
particular case. 7 In a subsequent case involving the Wyman-Gordon
Co., the NLRB applied the prospective requirement first announced in
its earlier decision in a way that invalidated a bargaining election because of the employer's failure to provide such a list of employees to the
union. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co. 8 required the Supreme Court to
decide whether Wyman- Gordon Co. was correct in asserting that the
NLRB action was invalid because the agency had originally used adjudication rather than rulemaking to adopt the requirement that an employer must furnish a list of employees to unions in these
circumstances.
While a majority of the Court upheld the action of the NLRB in
Wyman-Gordon, it split two ways on the justification for that result. In
an opinion for four members of the Court, Justice Fortas concluded
that the wholly prospective nature of the employee list requirement announced by the NLRB in its earlier case made the requirement a rule;
and because that rule had not been issued by the use of rulemaking
proceedings, it was invalid. But Justice Fortas refused to overturn the
Board's action in Wyman-Gordon, apparently because he believed that
6. /d. at 202.
7. Excelsior Underwear Inc., 1966-156 NLRB Dec. (CCH) '11 20,180.
8. 394 U.S. 7 59 (1969).
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in this particular case the Board had adjudicated anew the requirement
announced in its earlier case. As a result, the NLRB could properly
apply that requirement to Wyman-Gordon Co. in this case. 9 Justice
Black, writing for three members of the Court, also upheld the order of
the Board in Wyman-Gordon; but he did so on the ground that the
choice between proceeding by rule or by ad hoc order on a case-by-case
basis was one that was committed to agency discretion. 10
The Fortas plurality opinion and the two dissents in WymanGordon agreed that the wholly prospective nature of the employee list
requirement announced in the earlier NLRB case demonstrated that
the requirement should have been issued by the use of rulemaking procedures rather than in the course of an individual adjudication. 11 However, these opinions did not appear to challenge the basic Chenery principle that the choice of proceeding by rulemaking or adjudication to
elaborate agency law is up to the agency. Instead, they only appear to
insist that if agencies desire to issue rules (statements of general applicability and future effect implementing, interpreting, or prescribing
law) they must follow rulemaking procedures; and if they desire to issue orders (statements of particular applicability declaring individual
rights based on past facts) they must follow adjudicatory procedures.
The third principal decision of the United States Supreme Court
on the subject of agency freedom to choose the means by which it engages in lawmaking is NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. 12 In that case the
Supreme Court addressed the authority of the NLRB to determine
whether buyers were managerial employees exempted from the requirements of the National Labor Relations Act. The Court of Appeals
had concluded that the Board could proceed only by rulemaking in
making that determination. 18 On review, the Supreme Court determined otherwise and indicated that the agency was free, on remand, to
proceed either by rulemaking or by adjudication to determine whether
9. ld. at 766.
10. Jd. at 772.
II. Jd. at 765-66 (plurality opinion), 775 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 780 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
12. 416 U.S. 267 (1974). Another United States Supreme Court case that may be relevent to
this question is Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974), decided several months before Bell Aerospace. The Ruiz opinion stated that the agency involved was required to issue rules, and was
prohibited from engaging in wholly ad hoc lawmaking, with respect to the criteria applicable to
the grant or denial of the particular government benefits at issue in that case. This conclusion
seems to rest upon the provisions of the agency's own adopted procedures and the "abuse of discretion" prohibition contained in the Federal APA. ld. at 231-35. See infra Section IV D. However,
decisions of the United States Supreme Court before and after Ruiz do not require federal agencies, generally, to prefer lawmaking by rule over lawmaking by ad hoc order. Some lower federal
courts disagree, at least in certain contexts. See infra text accompanying notes 142-51.
13. 416 U.S. at 273.
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the buyers in that or other situations were managerial employees exempt from the National Labor Relations Act. In doing so, the Court
stressed that
[t]he views expressed in Chenery II and Wyman-Gordon make plain
that the Board is not precluded from announcing new principles in an
adjudicative proceeding and that the choice between rulemaking and
adjudication lies in the first instance within the Board's discretion.
Although there may be situations where the Board's reliance on adjudication would amount to an abuse of discretion. . . , nothing in the
present case would justify such a conclusion .... The Board's judgment that adjudication best serves ... [its] purpose is entitled to great
weight. 14

These three United States Supreme Court cases demonstrate that
federal agencies vested with both rulemaking and adjudicatory powers
may, except to the extent a statute provides otherwise, develop their
law either by rule or by order on a case-by-case basis, or by both
means; that their discretion as to the means by which they make their
law on a given subject is broad and will not be disturbed unless it is
abused; that there is a strong presumption in favor of the agency's
choice of lawmaking modality so that a person challenging its propriety
in a given situation has the burden of persuading a court that the
agency decision was an abuse of discretion; that the Supreme Court has
not clearly defined the unusual circumstances in which an agency decision to elaborate its law by adjudication rather than by rulemaking
would be improper; and that if an agency decides to issue a rule-a
statement of general applicability and future effect implementing, interpreting, or prescribing law-it must follow applicable rulemaking procedures and cannot do so in an adjudication. As reflected in these decisions of the United States Supreme Court, federal law does not create
any general preference for agency lawmaking by rule. Instead, it leaves
agencies relatively free to determine, in their own discretion, whether
they will elaborate their law on a particular subject primarily by
rulemaking or by adjudication.
Most states have uncritically followed federal law in this regard.
Numerous state court opinions declare that state agencies vested with
authority to issue rules and to engage in adjudication have almost unfettered discretion to choose the means by which they elaborate their
law. A study of the many state court opinions adopting this view suggests that it is based almost entirely on the belief that federal law has
settled this matter for the states, rather than on an analysis of the state
14. /d. at 294.
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administrative process problem at which this law is directed and a conclusion that the merits of current federal law make its adoption in the
state context desirable. However, individual states are free to make
their own choice on this subject, except to the extent that the federal
constitution requires otherwise. And the federal constitution does not
prohibit a state from generally requiring its agencies to prefer rulemaking over adjudication as a means of lawmaking, so long as that requirement is qualified by a rule of reason.
The typical state court opinion on this subject asserts that where
an administrative agency is authorized to develop its law by rulemaking
or by adjudication, the agency has broad discretion, in the absence of a
specific statute to the contrary, to select which of these procedures it
will employ to make law on a particular subject. 111 State court opinions
announcing this conclusion often cite Chenery and sometimes WymanGordon and/ or Bell Aerospace to support that proposition. 16 Potential
differences between state and federal agencies or the contexts in which
they operate that might be relevant to the wisdom of applying that federal law principle to the state administrative process are not discussed.
Furthermore, none of these state cases suggest that state agencies must
use rulemaking rather than adjudication as their principal means of
lawmaking, or even that they must do so to the extent practicable and
feasible. Indeed, as a group, they appear to support the proposition that
state agencies delegated the authority to issue rules and to decide individual cases are usually free to elaborate their law primarily if not exclusively by ad hoc adjudication.

15. Potts v. Bennett, 487 So. 2d 919, 921 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985); Amerada Hess Pipeline
Corp., v. Alaska Pub. Uti!. Comm'n, 711 P.2d 1170, 1178 (Alaska 1986); ALRB v. California
Coastal Farms, Inc., 31 Cal. 3d 469, 473, 645 P.2d 739, 743, 183 Cal. Rptr. 231, 235 (1982);
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Department of Business, 393 So. 2d 1177, 1182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981); Young Plumbing and Heating Co. v. Iowa, 276 N.W.2d 377, 382 (Iowa 1979); Consumer
Protection Div. Office of the Attorney Gen. v. Consumer Publishing Co., 304 Md. 731, 753-54,
501 A.2d 48, 60 (1985); Town of Brookline v. Commissioner of Dept. of Envtl. Quality Eng'g,
387 Mass. 372, 379, 439 N .E.2d 792, 799 (1982); Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Department of Pub.
Uti!., 383 Mass. 675, 679,421 N.E.2d 449,451 (1981); AFSCME Council25 v. Wayne County,
152 Mich. App. 87, 98 393 N.W.2d 889, 894 (1986); American Way Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 131 Mich. App. 1, 2, 345 N.W.2d 634, 635 (Mich. App. 1983); Bunge Corp. v.
Commissioner of Revenue, 305 N.W.2d 779, 785 (Minn. 1981); Occidental Chern. v. New York
State Envtl. Facilities, 125 Misc. 2d 1046, 1050, 480 N.Y.S.2d 838, 841 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984);
Dressler Coal Corp. v. Call, 4 Ohio App. 3d 81, 84, 446 N.E.2d 785, 789 (1981); Mollinedo v.
Texas Employment Comm'n, 662 S.W.2d 732, 738 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); State Bd. of Ins. v.
Deffebach, 631 S.W.2d 794, 799 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
16. See cases cited supra note 15.
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REASONS STATE AGENCIES SHOULD PREFER LAWMAKING BY
RULE

To understand the reasons why a general preference for state
agency lawmaking by rule rather than by ad hoc adjudication is desirable one must first appreciate the practical differences between law embodied in rules and law embodied in orders. A rule is an agency statement of general applicability and future effect that implements,
interprets, or prescribes law or policy or the organization, procedures,
or practice requirements of an agency. It includes a statement that
amends, repeals, or suspends another rule. As a result, rules create
binding law in the form of statements directly applicable to all those to
whom they are addressed. Agencies are also bound by their own rules.
However, for good cause a rule may, under some circumstances, and
within specific limitations, be waived by the issuing agency; but if not,
a rule directly binds all those within its terms, whether or not they
participated in the rulemaking proceeding from whence the rule
originated. 17
On the other hand, an order is an agency statement of particular
applicability determining the rights of specific parties on the basis of
their special circumstances. So orders only result in the ad hoc adoption
of principles of law that are necessary to solve the particular cases in
which those principles are announced. Nevertheless, they may serve as
precedent in similar future cases. An order is not binding directly on
any persons other than the parties to that particular case. Therefore,
persons other than the specific parties to that case have the right to
argue that the precedent should not be followed in their case, and that
the agency should consider de novo whether the principle on which the
precedent rests should apply in their case. 18 In reality, however, principles of law declared in particular cases tend to have the same effect as
rules. The reason for this is that once an agency adjudicates a principle
of law as part of the resolution of a specific case, the agency tends to
follow that principle uncritically in all similar future cases, without any
serious reexamination. To that extent, the practical effect of agency law
issued in an order does not differ from agency law issued in a rule.
The typical state administrative procedure act contains two sepa17. See generally A. BoNFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING § 3.3 (1986); I C.
KoCH, jR. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE§ 2.3 (1985); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 4.1-2 (2d ed. 1984).
18. See sources cited supra note 17. See also Berg, Re-examining Policy Procedures: The
Choice Between Rulemaking and Adjudication, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 149, 177, 178 (1986); Young
Plumbing and Heating Co. v. Iowa Natural Resources Council, 276 N.W.2d 377, 382-83 (Iowa
1979).

AGENCY LAWMAKING BY RULE
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rate sets of procedures-one for rulemaking and one for adjudication. 19
While agencies delegated authority to issue rules and to decide individual cases normally have broad discretion as to the means by which they
may make particular law, they are bound by their state act to follow
scrupulously the procedures appurtenant to whatever means of lawmaking they actually choose in a particular instance. So, "either means
[of agency lawmaking] may be used so long as the [appropriate] statutory procedure is complied with." 20 As a result, "[i]f an agency relies
upon a rule ... to support its action, the rule must have been promulgated in accord with the [rulemaking] procedure in effect at that
time." 21 An agency may not issue a rule in an adjudication. 22 Similarly,
an agency may not decide a particular case through the use of rulemaking procedures; it must use applicable adjudication procedures to issue
such an individual decision with precedential value.
There are, however, a number of significant advantages of
rulemaking as compared to adjudication that suggest the former should
generally be preferred over the latter for state agency lawmaking. 23
Some of the advantages of rulemaking are a product of the particular
procedures used in the adoption of rules and some are a product of the
nature of rules without regard to the procedures employed in their
adoption. 24 Consider, first, the extent to which all persons who may be
affected by agency lawmaking have an opportunity to participate in an
adjudication as compared to a rulemaking. Normally, only those persons who are actually parties to a particular dispute giving rise to an
adjudication are notified of, or have a right to participate in, that proceeding.211 This means that other persons who may subsequently be affected by the precedential value of an adjudicative decision of an agency
do not usually have an effective opportunity to participate in its formulation. It also means that members of the general public do not have an
effective opportunity to influence law made on a case-by-case, precedential basis. Liberal rights to intervene and to file amicus briefs in
adjudications are not substitutes for an opportunity to participate in
rulemaking proceedings on the same subjects. After all, most people
19. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1961) § 3-4 and 9-14, 14
371 (1980) [hereinafter 1961 MSAPA]. The acts of most states are based on the 1961

U.L.A.

MSAPA.

20. 276 N.W.2d at 382.
21. /d.
22. /d. at 382-83.
23. For a brief summary statement of many of the following advantages of rulemaking over
adjudication see Berg, supra note 18, at 163-64.
24. See Berg, supra note 18, at 164.
25. See 1961 MSAPA, supra note 19, §§ 9(a), 1(5).
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affected by ad hoc agency lawmaking on a precedential basis will not
even know about the existence of current agency adjudications of importance to them. Even if they did, it is unlikely that all of them could
or would be allowed an effective opportunity to participate in such
adjudications.
In rulemaking, however, the situation is quite different. The typical state administrative procedure act requires agencies to give advance
notice of proposed rules to the general public and to give an opportunity for all interested members of the general public to comment on
those proposals prior to their adoption. 26 This means that persons who
are not parties to an adjudication declaring new law have a better opportunity to protect their interests if the law in question is made by
rulemaking rather than by adjudication. It also means that the publicat-large has a better opportunity to influence law made by rule than by
order because rulemaking procedure gives members of the general public a more effective opportunity to mobilize political pressures for and
against a proposed agency policy than does adjudication procedure.
Agencies making policy by rule are also likely to have access to a
broader base of relevent information if they make their law by rule
rather than by order because a wider class of affected persons and the
general public will have an opportunity to submit information to the
agency about the desirability of that law before it becomes final.
Rulemaking is also better than adjudication if one wishes to ensure
that an administrative lawmaking product is consistent with the popular will. The trial-type procedures typically used in the agency adjudicative process, including bans on ex parte communications and exclusivity of the record requirements, tend to protect agencies seeking to
implement their own policy preferences in the course of such an adjudicative process against intervention in that process by outside political
pressures. On the other hand, the notice and comment procedures typically used in the state agency rulemaking process permit and facilitate
intervention in that process by members of the general public in a way
that allows them to frustrate, through the use of external political pressures, agency policy preferences that are inconsistent with the will of
the community-at-large as reflected in the balance of power in current
interest group politics.
This, then, is another reason why state agencies should generally
be required to employ rulemaking rather than adjudication for their
lawmaking. Agency lawmaking cannot be deemed legitimate unless its
product is consistent with the will of the community-at-large as ex26. See 1961 MSAPA, supra note 19, § 3(a).
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pressed by its popularly elected legislature. This is so because, in our
society, sovereignty ultimately resides in the body politic and not in its
many unelected administrative agents. Of course, there are two ways to
ensure that agency lawmaking is consistent with the popular will.
First, the delegation ... [to agencies of lawmaking] authority may be
made with such precise instructions concerning the end to be achieved
that logic and technological competence ... will dictate a relatively
narrow range of results. Or, second, the manner of exercising an imprecise delegation may be designed to reflect the same forces that
work upon the [popularly elected] legislature itself, and thus to produce approximately the same results. 27

The first means of ensuring the accountability of agency lawmaking has generally failed because modern legislative delegations to agencies of lawmaking authority tend to be very imprecise and vague. However, the second means of ensuring the accountability of agency
lawmaking has succeeded. But its success has required a highly political scheme of everyday agency lawmaking in order to ensure that the
product of that process conducted under broad and vague delegations is
consistent with the wishes of the legislature. 28 Since the rulemaking
process permits and facilitates efforts by interested members of the general public to block, through the use of political pressures, implementation of the policy preferences of our administrative agents that are inconsistent with the balance of political power in the community, and
the adjudication process does not, rulemaking is generally a more desirable agency lawmaking process than adjudication.
Agency law made by rule is generally better than agency law
made by ad hoc order for another reason. Agency rules are almost always more highly visible than agency case law to members of the public. The reason for this is that members of the public can more easily
ascertain the existence and specific contents of agency law that is embodied in rules than agency law embodied in adjudicatory decisions.
The compilation of state administrative rules is published and is available in public libraries and law libraries in all communities in the state.
State agency case law, however, is almost never published and is usually available only in the files of the agency. Even the legal right to
copy those decisions contained in agency files cannot overcome this difference, and the practical problems it causes for regulated persons seeking to ascertain the precise contents of the law to which they must conform. It should be noted that federal agency case law is much more
27. Scalia, Two Wrongs Make a Right: The judicialization of Standardless Rulemaking,
1977 at 38, 40.
28. See id.

REG., July-Aug.

172

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

(Volume 2

frequently published and, therefore, much more easily available than
state agency case law which is almost never published. Consequently,
on this basis the argument for requiring agencies to make their law by
rule is more compelling for state agencies than for federal agencies.
The fact that the unpublished case law of state agencies is much
less visible and accessible than their widely disseminated published
rules also means that the governor and legislature may not effectively
monitor law made by agencies in the course of adjudications. Furthermore, neither the governor nor the legislature may use the special powers they have in many states to review effectively agency lawmaking
when it is executed wholly on a case-by-case basis. The reason for this
is that state administrative procedure acts vest them with such special
review powers only with respect to agency rules. 29 No acceptable
scheme has yet been devised for the systematic and effective review by
the governor and legislature of agency law created on a case-by-case
basis in adjudications.
To make state schemes for the review of agency rulemaking fully
effective, state agencies must be precluded from making their most controversial policies by ad hoc order. Otherwise, state agencies could bypass completely these formidable executive and legislative review mechanisms calculated to check agency lawmaking that is inconsistent with
the political will of the community-at-large. It should be noted that
state administrative procedure acts contain much more formidable
schemes of executive and legislative review of agency rules than currently exist in federal law. 30 As a result, there is a greater need on this
basis to impose a preference for lawmaking by rule on state agencies
than on federal agencies. If Congress decides to create a more effective
scheme for executive and legislative review of federal agency rulemaking, it would probably increase the restrictions on the freedom of federal agencies to make law on an ad hoc precedential basis in individual
cases. Otherwise such a scheme would not accomplish its objectives.
Agency lawmaking by rule is generally better than agency lawmaking by order for another reason. It is likely to be easier for members of the general public to discern current agency law from rules than
from adjudications because decisional law is normally more difficult for
laymen to understand. Interpretation of decisional law depends on the
particular facts involved in the cases in which that law originated.
Rules, on the other hand, are not dependent on the particular facts
from which they first emerged. The product of adjudication is also in29. See Bonfield State Law In The Teaching of Administrative Law: A Critical Analysis of
The Status Quo, 61 TEX. L. REv. 95, 110-23 (1982).
30. Id.
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ferior to the product of rulemaking insofar as it serves as a guide to the
agency staff and the regulated public. Unless an adjudicatory decision is
distorted with dictum relating to situations not involved in that particular case, both the agency staff and the regulated public must resort to
reading a line of cases and formulating from them a statement of the
principles followed by the agency with respect to a more general matter. This is not only time consuming and expensive because of its dependence upon specialized talents cultivated primarily by lawyers, but
also because it tends to induce unnecessary error and conflict because of
inevitable misreadings. 31
Another advantage of rulemaking over adjudication as a means of
agency lawmaking relates to efficiency. After all, a rule is a statement
of general applicability while an order is only a statement of particular
applicability. As a result, lawmaking by adjudication is likely to require litigation before the agency in a multiplicity of cases, whereas a
single rulemaking may settle the policy questions involved in many
cases without need for future litigation before the agency to resolve
them. 32 That is, a single rule can eliminate issues of law in many cases,
leaving only issues of disputed facts, thereby eliminating the necessity
for repetitive arguments in multiple adjudications on the many policy
issues that may be settled by a single rule. 33 Lawmaking by rule is also
more efficient than lawmaking by order because it allows agencies to
focus upon a few proceedings raising comparatively few major policy
issues. When agencies make law by adjudication, however, they must
often spread their attention thinly over a large number of cases that
raise an even larger number of minor policy issues as well as major
policy issues. 34
Rulemaking is also generally superior to adjudication for agency
lawmaking because rulemaking requires the agency to focus on the issues of law that must be decided, without being diverted, as it is in
adjudication, by the more specific and parochial concerns of particular
parties who wish to have their dispute resolved. 35 Of course, it may also
31. See Peck, A Critique of the National Labor Relations Board's Performance in Policy
Formulation: Adjudication and Rule-making, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 254, 272 (1968).
32. See Baker, Policy by Rule or Ad Hoc Approach - Which Should It Be? 22 LAw &
CoNTt:MP. PROBS. 658, 664 (1957).
33. See Note, The Use of Agency Rulemaking to Deny Adjudications Apparently Required
by Statute, 54 IowA L. REV. 1086, 1100-1101 (1969).
34. See, e.g., Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 590-92 (1970) ("The principal advantage of rule
making is that it provides clear articulation of broad agency policy. By contrast, the entire array of
[an agency's] adjudicatory decisions on a subject often gives a diffuse, overly subtle mosaic of
current [agency] doctrine.").
35. See Fuchs, Agency Development of Policy Through Rule-Making, 59 Nw. U.L. Rt:v.
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be argued that lawmaking by rule is undesirable because it requires
agencies to make decisions in the abstract, without the benefit of an
actual case to test their wisdom or to help clarify the issues involved.
However, the fact that rulemaking requires an agency to make decisions in the abstract is a factor that an agency can and should consider
in determining whether, in a particular situation, rulemaking is infeasible or impracticable. But the fear of abstract decisionmaking is not a
sound argument for resisting the imposition on agencies of a general
duty to prefer rulemaking in situations where it is feasible and
practicable.
Note also that agency lawmaking by rule rather than by order is
preferable because it enables the parties and decision makers in adjudications to ascertain and focus more clearly on the precise facts that
must be demonstrated in such cases. 36 In adjudications, where agencies
make the applicable law and also determine if it has been violated, the
parties and decisionmakers often confuse the necessary facts and burden
of persuasion associated with the law-applying function, with the necessary facts and burden of persuasion associated with the lawmaking
function. Furthermore, an important or novel question of law may arise
in an adjudication that is not necessary to a decision in that particular
case. However, attempts to resolve it in that context could result in a
deemphasis of the actual controversy involved, an unconscionable delay
to its conclusion, a distortion of the question of law involved, and an
inadequately informed and dispassionate consideration of its merits.
Nevertheless, when agencies rely heavily on case-by-case decisions to
make their law, attempts at resolving issues of law in adjudications that
do not squarely present them are inevitable because more suitable cases
for resolving those issues may be unavailable. 37
Lawmaking by rule is also generally more desirable than lawmaking by order because the former allows an agency to initiate, on its
own, changes in or elaborations of its law. On the other hand, lawmaking by order leaves the initiative for such changes or elaborations to
private parties who start litigation or engage in action prompting
agency enforcement proceedings. 38 In other words, an agency need not
await the occurrence of a set of facts involving a particular individual to
make law embodied in a rule. The agency may make that law whenever it desires, prior to any violations, and as a means of avoiding the
781, 788-90 (1965).
36. Frohnmayer, The Oregon Administrative Procedure Act: An Essay on State Administrative Rulemaking Procedure Reform, 58 OR. L. REv. 411, 442 (1980).
37. See Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication In the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 937-40 (1965).
38. See Bernstein, supra note 34, at 590-92.
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occurrence of such circumstances in the first place. So, rulemaking, unlike adjudication, allows an agency to create its own lawmaking time
table and to implement its own system of lawmaking priorities.
In addition, rulemaking is a superior means of lawmaking with
respect to matters directly affecting a significant number of persons
who are not likely to be represented by lawyers. This is so because
informal notice and comment rulemaking procedures are generally
more accessible to persons who do not have the assistance of counsel
and are easier for them to use, than are formal, trial-type, adjudicative
procedures. Adjudicative procedures almost always require the assistance of counsel because of their complexity and reliance upon skills
specially possessed by lawyers. Since state agencies ordinarily make law
directly affecting substantial numbers of persons who are not represented by counsel either because they are too poor to afford such representation or because the matters involved have relatively small financial
value, 39 those agencies should be required to make their law primarily
by rule rather than by order. This argument for a rulemaking preference is less persuasive with respect to federal agencies. Persons involved
in the federal administrative process are, in general, more likely to be
represented by lawyers than those involved in the similar state
processes. This is so because the matters dealt with by federal agencies
tend to have larger financial value than the matters dealt with by state
agencies, and organizations representing the poor appear to be more
available to protect the interests of such persons in the federal administrative process than in the similar processes of the several states.
Another reason why state agencies should prefer rulemaking over
adjudication for their lawmaking is that rules are normally prospective-they indicate the law that the agency will rely upon in the future.
Adjudication, on the other hand, has the disadvantage of being inherently retrospective, declaring rights based on past acts. As a result, lawmaking by rule gives affected persons fair notice of agency law, permitting them to conduct their affairs accordingly, while lawmaking by
adjudication does not. One of the most serious adverse affects of using
the adjudication process for agency lawmaking, therefore, is the retroactive effect upon parties who legitimately relied upon prior law, or
had no advance notice of the new law suddenly declared by the agency
as a basis for its decision in their cases. Of course, courts make retroactive policy changes in the course of adjudications, "but courts have no
substantive rulemaking powers." 40 The same is not true of most administrative agencies. Typically, administrative agencies have authority to
39. See Bonfield, supra note 29, at 127.
40. See Peck, supra note 31, at 273.
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make their law either by rule or by order. To avoid retroactive lawmaking, agencies should make as much of their law as is possible by
rule rather than by order. It may be argued that an increase in
rulemaking as a means of elaborating agency policy at the expense of
ad hoc lawmaking is undesirable because the prospective nature of
rulemaking may encourage agencies to interpret applicable statutes
more expansively than they might in adjudications whose product
would be retrospective. The answer to that fear, of course, is that judicial review and legislative action is always available to check any unwarranted agency interpretations of applicable statutes in rulemaking.
Primary reliance on rulemaking for agency lawmaking is also desirable because it is more likely to assure uniform treatment of similarly situated persons than is the use of adjudication for that purpose.
All persons subject to a rule are affected at the same time and in the
same way. 41 Agency lawmaking by adjudication, however, increases the
likelihood that agencies will draw irrelevant distinctions between substantially similar cases and allows agencies to disregard applicable
precedents in some cases on the grounds they are not technically binding on other persons. Therefore, adjudication is not an especially appropriate means for the formulation of legal principles that are in fact
applicable to a broad class of persons because it permits low visibility,
differential agency decisionmaking of an arbitrary or capricious nature.
Lawmaking by rule might be deemed inferior to lawmaking by
order precisely because rules are statements of general applicability
rather than of particular applicability and, therefore, mandate uniform
treatment for all those subject to their provisions. The argument is that
agencies should not be bound to apply agency law to all cases within its
ambit. Universal application of agency law necessarily results in unreasonable consequences. Agencies must, therefore, be free to elaborate and
apply agency law in an ad hoc manner. This, of course, can be accomplished more easily when agency law is made in adjudications. The ad
hoc elaboration and application of agency law might also be deemed to
result in fairer regulation because the contents of the law and the application of the law can be carefully tailored to the facts of each case,
thereby avoiding the overgeneralizations inherent in rulemaking which
necessarily results in a product that is of general applicability.' 2
This argument is unpersuasive. Agencies have always had some
prosecutorial discretion in the application of their rules. As a result,
agencies may refuse to apply a rule to inappropriate circumstances oth41. See 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 178-80 (1965).
42. See E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM
UNREASONABLENESS (1982).
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erwise within the rule's ambit. Also, as long as third party rights are
not adversely affected, an agency may waive the applicability of a rule
to a particular individual on the ground that its application in that
specific instance would be unfair or without value to the public interest.
Further, the main principle embodied in a rule may be drawn as
broadly or narrowly as an agency deems wise. A rule can also have as
many narrowly drawn exceptions to its main principle as the issuing
agency thinks prudent. In addition, agency application of a rule to a
particular factual situation which is inconsistent with the purpose of
the rule, or which otherwise causes an unreasonable result, may be successfully challenged under almost all state administrative procedure acts
because those statutes typically prohibit arbitrary or capricious agency
action. Lastly, rules need not always eliminate the discretion of an
agency to tailor its actions to particular factual circumstances. Indeed,
rules may expressly confer such discretion on an agency and specify
some or all of the factors that must be considered in exercising that
discretion.
In considering the desirability of a required preference for state
agency rulemaking we should not forget that we have had decades of
experience with agency lawmaking that was predominantly ad hoc. Experience demonstrates that abusive agency action is much more likely to
result from ad hoc agency lawmaking than from lawmaking that is of
general applicability. What we need, therefore, is a clear preference for
agency lawmaking by rule in order to minimize low visibility agency
decisionmaking of an arbitrary or capricious nature.
It has been asserted that the "procedural advantages of rulemaking
... are headed for extinction" because the courts and legislature have
moved a great deal of rulemaking from informal notice and comment
procedures, to much more formal trial-type procedures. 43 If so, many of
the arguments for a general rulemaking preference discussed earlier
would be weakened. Note, however, that state agency rulemaking
under the provisions of the 1961 MSAPA, which has been adopted by
most states;" is of the simple notice and comment variety rather than
the more complex hybrid or adjudicative variety found in many recent
federal statutes governing particular agency rulemaking. 411 As a result,
the procedural advantages of rulemaking over adjudication for most
state agency lawmaking are not headed for extinction although, admit43. Scalia, Back to Basics: Making Law Without Making Rules, REG. July-Aug. 1981 at 25,
26.
44. 1961 MSAPA, supra note 19, § 3 at 387.
45. See Rago, Rulemaking Under the Model State Administrative Procedure Act: An Opportunity Missed, 34 ADMIN. L. REV. 445, 458-60 (1982).
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tedly, they have been substantially diminished for many federal
agencies.
Prior discussion demonstrates that state agency lawmaking by rule
is generally superior to state agency lawmaking by order. It also demonstrates that the advantages of rulemaking over adjudication for administrative lawmaking are greater, in a number of important respects,
for state agencies than for federal agencies. First, state agency decisions
in particular adjudications are virtually never published while the decisions of many federal agencies are published. This makes public access
to state agency case law much more difficult, in general, than public
access to federal agency case law, or public access to state agency rules
which are virtually always published. Second, the legislatures of most
states have established comprehensive and effective means for the gubernatorial and legislative review of state agency lawmaking by rule,
while Congress has not established any similar scheme with which to
review the rules of federal agencies. For this reason, there is a special
need to ensure that state agencies (but not federal agencies) make their
law primarily by rules which are subject to these elaborate review
mechanisms rather than by orders which are not. Third, persons affected by state agency proceedings are far less likely to be represented
by lawyers than persons affected by federal agency proceedings. As a
result, there is a greater need for state agencies than for federal agencies to make agency law through rulemaking proceedings that do not
usually require the use of the special skills of lawyers, than through
adjudicatory proceedings where the use of the special skills of lawyers
are often essential. Finally, the procedural advantages of rulemaking
over adjudication for most agency lawmaking are greater for state agencies than for federal agencies because virtually all state rulemaking is
still of the simple notice and comment variety, while a great deal of the
federal rulemaking authorized in recent years is of a hybrid variety
and, therefore, is more complicated and expensive. All of these reasons
suggest that a preference for agency lawmaking by rule is more justified for state agencies than for federal agencies.
Nevertheless, it is clear that state agencies may not and should not
dispense entirely with case-by-case lawmaking. There will always be
some ambiguities in existing agency rules that will need to be answered
in individual cases. The decisions in those cases will inevitably constitute an ad hoc law of precedential value that will supplement agency
rules. In addition, there will always be unforseen issues left unanswered by rules. Even good decisionmakers are not omniscient enough
to anticipate all future problems that may arise within their jurisdiction, and to solve them in advance by rule. So, for example, lawmaking
in the course of adjudications may be warranted to deal with the perpe-
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trators of unforeseen harmful acts. Otherwise the perpetrator of such
an act could not be stopped "until a rule against the practice was first
adopted and he was then found to have engaged in the practice after
adoption of the rule. " 46
There are other situations in which agency lawmaking on a caseby-case basis is the only possible or sensible way for an agency to proceed. Case-by-case agency lawmaking may be better than rulemaking,
for example, in those particular situations in which the agency does not
yet feel it is in a position to make generally applicable law because of
the agency's current lack of expertise; or because the distinctions in the
area are so numerous or complex that the agency is not yet in a position to articulate them in the form of a generally applicable legal principle; or because the lack of a concrete factual setting would make any
general principle of law adopted too theoretical to be useful or sensible.
Further, in some situations agency law made by adjudication may be
superior to agency law made by rulemaking because adjudication is less
likely to be over-inclusive or under-inclusive than rulemaking. 47 That
is, given the general inability of rules to deal with novel or unanticipated factual situations, and the great likelihood that rules will cover
unnecessary or unintended circumstances because of their general applicability, lawmaking through adjudication may be "more cost-effective, less cumbersome, and more palatable politically" in some situations than agency lawmaking in the form of rules.' 8
It seems clear, therefore, that agency lawmaking by ad hoc adjudication can not and should not be entirely eliminated. Agencies must
retain authority to make law on a case-by-case basis whenever, and to
whatever extent, the use of rulemaking is genuinely infeasible or impracticable. However, in all other circumstances the advantages of
rulemaking as compared to adjudication suggest that state agencies
should be required to elaborate their law by rule, and should be prohibited from relying primarily on adjudication for the performance of
that function. Nevertheless, this duty should be subject to a moderating
principle so that rulemaking would be required for this purpose only
when, and to the extent, it is feasible and practicable under the circumstances. This means that state agencies authorized to issue rules and
decide individual cases would lose their currently broad discretion to
choose, freely, between rulemaking and adjudication in the making of
their law. The two competing lawmaking modalities would no longer
46. Scalia, supra note 43, at 28.
47. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE
RULEMAKING 82-83 (1983).
48. !d. at 83.
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be co-equal choices. Agencies would be required to employ rulemaking
rather than adjudication unless they could justify their assertion that
the former could not reasonably be employed for the purpose in light of
the relevent circumstances.
It could be argued, however, that the price of enforcing such a
duty on agencies, including the costs of all kinds that might result from
any ambiguities in the precise scope of the obligation, would make the
imposition of that duty undesirable. There is an answer to this criticism
of a mandatory preference for state agency rulemaking. The costs flowing from the imposition of such a requirement are unlikely to be as
great as critics assert; and the many benefits of such a requirement
indicated in prior discussion are, in any case, likely to far outweigh
whatever costs the requirement is likely to engender. Few people suggest, for example, that the almost universal prohibition against arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable agency action, should be eliminated
because it costs too much to enforce that prohibition in absolute terms,
or in relation to its benefits. As a result, imposition of a requirement
that state agencies make as much of their law by rule as is feasible and
practicable under the circumstances is fully justified.
IV.

A.

JUDICIAL IMPOSITION OF RULEMAKING REQUIREMENTS

Generally

A few state courts have restricted the general freedom of state
agencies to choose between rulemaking and adjudication for the elaboration of their law. These courts have required agencies in their respective jurisdictions to engage in lawmaking by rule rather than by order
in various circumstances and to specified extents. They have, therefore,
denied state agencies delegated the authority to issue rules and to decide
individual cases the virtually unfettered opportunity those agencies had
previously exercised to choose adjudication rather than rulemaking as
the primary means of elaborating their law. The most unusual aspect
of this preference for agency lawmaking by rule is that it has been
created by the courts in the absence of any statute expressly requiring
that result. Consequently, this preference for administrative rulemaking
is wholly a product of judicial, rather than legislative, creativity.
In considering court decisions requiring state agencies to use
rulemaking rather than adjudication for specified lawmaking, care
should be taken to distinguish from the subject at hand cases requiring
agencies to follow rulemaking procedures rather than adjudicatory procedures in situations where an agency had attempted to issue a "rule"
in an adjudication. As noted earlier, agencies must follow rulemaking
procedures when they issue "rules"; they may not issue a statement
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qualifying as a "rule" by using adjudicatory procedures. There are
state cases in which an agency had issued a statement of law that qualified as a de facto "rule" through the use of procedures appropriate only
to ad hoc adjudication. The courts invalidated such agency action because it was required to be accomplished by the issuance of a de jure
"rule" after appropriate rulemaking procedures. 49 Cases of this kind
are inapposite to the present discussion. 60 These cases cannot be cited
49. See, e.g., the following line of New Jersey cases: Metromedia Inc. v. Director, Div. of
Taxation, 97 N.J. 313, 328-37, 478 A.2d 742, 748-755 (1984); Department of Envtl. Protection v.
Stavola, 103 N.J. 425, 436-38, 511 A.2d 622, 628-29 (1986) (both cases apparently holding that
the particular agency determinations of law involved were de facto rules, and, therefore, could not
be applied to particular persons in the absence of the prior issuance of de jure rules adopted in
conformance with applicable rulemaking procedures); Texter v. Department of Human Serv., 88
N.J. 376, 443 A.2d 178 (1982) (impliedly suggesting that agencies could not issue a de facto rule
amending an existing rule by an adjudicatory order but, instead, must do so, if it chooses to do so,
by a rule subject to rulemaking procedures). Cf Airwork Serv. Div. v. Director, Div. of Taxation,
97 N.J. 290, 300-02 478 A.2d 729, 734, 735 (1984) (apparently holding that a particular agency
determination was an order rather than a rule and, therefore, the agency could use adjudicatory
procedures rather than rulemaking procedures for its issuance).
It should be noted, however, that at least some of the language used by the New Jersey
Supreme Court might suggest that agencies are required, in certain circumstances, to make law by
de jure rules rather than by de jure orders, and that the agency action involved was held void not
because it constituted a de facto rule adopted without benefit of required rulemaking procedures
but, instead, because the agency failed to make law by rule in the first place. See 103 N.J. at 43639, 511 A.2d at 628-29. Nevertheless, a careful analysis of this entire line of New Jersey cases
suggests that the latter reading of this language is probably incorrect because these cases presented
situations in which the court believed that the agencies involved had improperly attempted to issue
de facto rules without following required rulemaking procedures. See also 613 Corp. v. Division
of State Lottery, 210 N.J. Super. 485, 510 A.2d 103 (1986), discussed infra note 139.
Boller Beverages, Inc. v. Davis, 38 N.J. 138, 183 A.2d 64 (1962), is a peculiar New Jersey
case because it is difficult to ascertain from an isolated reading of that opinion whether the agency
action involved was invalid because it was a de facto rule that was issued without the benefit of
rulemaking procedures, id. at 155, 183 A.2d at 73 (action here "amounts to ad hoc legislation"),
or because the agency enabling act required it to make law on the particular subject involved by
rule rather than by order, id. at 154, 183 A.2d at 72 ("We are unable to divine a legislative intent
to empower ad hoc lawmaking in the [specific] categories in which the promulgation of general
rules and regulations is authorized"), or because the court exercised an inherent judicial authority
to invalidate as unfair administrative lawmaking by ad hoc order when the agency in question was
also authorized to engage in such lawmaking by rule, id. at 155; 183 A.2d at 73 ("Where an
administrative agent is given full rule-making power, he must, in all fairness, bottom an alleged
violation on general legislation before he may rule in a particular case"). However, a later case
appears to make clear that the reason for the insistence of the court in Boller Beverages that the
agency was required to make the law involved through rulemaking proceedings and could not do
so by ad hoc order was that the agency determination in question was of "general applicability"
and, therefore, was a rule de facto but not de jure. Metromedia, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation,
97 N.J. 313, 329, 478 A.2d 742, 750 (1984).
50. There is also an inapposite but interesting line of Florida cases that might be misread to
suggest that a court may require an agency delegated authority to make law by adjudication as
well as by rulemaking to do so by rule in specified situations. However, the actual holding of these
cases is far more limited and makes them inapposite to the subject of this section-the authority of
courts to require agencies to prefer rulemaking over adjudication for their lawmaking in specified
circumstances. In fact, these Florida cases hold that an agency authorized to make law either by
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for the proposition that a court has required an agency to make its law,
in specified circumstances, by rule rather than by order; instead, they
may only be cited for the proposition that when an agency issues a
statement that in fact qualifies as a "rule," it must do so by the use of
rulemaking procedures, and cannot do so through the use of adjudicatory procedures.
There are, however, state cases explicitly holding on one basis or
another that state agencies must, in specified situations, engage in lawmaking by rule rather than by order. In those situations, courts have
insisted that the agency must make its law in a form that qualifies as a
"rule" and by procedures appropriate to the issuance of a "rule," and
may not choose to do so in a form that qualifies as an "order" and by
procedures that are appropriate to the issuance of an "order." These
cases are the focus of this section because these cases establish, to one
extent or another, a preference for agency lawmaking by rule.
In three respects this state court development has been quite limited. First, it has occurred only in a handful of states. Second, the judicial imposition of a mandatory preference for state agency rulemaking
has been justified on several different bases, some of which are dubious.
Third, the required rulemaking obligations imposed on agencies by
state courts have been narrow in scope, so they do not satisfy the need
for a broad-scoped, general preference for state agency lawmaking by
rule. As a result, these judicial developments are not an adequate substitute for an express legislative solution to this problem. Absent such a
solution, however, some of these judicial developments seem more
promising than others, and are worthy of emulation by other state
courts.
rulemaking or by adjudication may do so by adjudication only if the record of the adjudicatory
proceeding contains fully adequate reasons and factual support for the ad hoc law it creates, and
the parties to the proceeding were given an opportunity to challenge the foundation for the new
case law principle adjudicated therein. These cases, then, do not prohibit agency lawmaking by ad
hoc order; instead, they insist that such a policymaking order may be de jure only if it is backed
by fully adequate justifications in the record of the adjudicatory proceeding. See McDonald v.
Department of Banking and Fin., 346 So. 2d 569, 582-83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); AnheuserBusch, Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, 393 So. 2d 1177, 1182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981); Florida Cities Water Co. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 384 So. 2d 1280, 1281 (Fla.
1980); Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Indiantown Telephone System, Inc. 435 So. 2d 892, 895-96
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
A perusal of these Florida cases will indicate, however, that the Florida courts have not been
reluctant to suggest situations in which they believed agency lawmaking by rule was preferable to
lawmaking by order. But they have not required agencies to make their law by de jure rule rather
than by de jure order in such situations in the absence of a provision in an agency's enabling act
mandating that they do so by rule. See A. ENGLAND AND H. LEVINSON, FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE MANUAL §§ 9.05, 9.07, 12.24 (1979).
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Principle of Statutory Construction

The Oregon Supreme Court has devised the most defensible justification for a court to impose on agencies, in the absence of an express
statutory requirement, a fairly broad obligation to prefer rulemaking
over adjudication for administrative lawmaking. Although this obligation originated in Oregon cases involving occupational licensing, it appears to have a broader application and common sense legitimacy. The
rulemaking obligation announced by the Oregon Supreme Court is embodied in a general principle of statutory construction. That general
principle is this: In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, a
legislature is presumed to have intended agencies that have been delegated express authority to issue rules and express or implied authority
to decide individual cases, subject to a vague statutory standard, to elaborate that statutory standard by rule rather than by order, as soon as
feasible and to the extent practicable. The justification for this judicially imposed rulemaking obligation is a putative legislative intention
based on the assumption that a reasonable legislature under the circumstances defined by this principle would be likely to have intended that
result if it had considered the question.
The many substantial reasons indicated earlier for generally preferring rulemaking over adjudication for state agency lawmaking justify
the reasonableness of this judicial assumption. The reasonableness of
this assumption about legislative intentions is also supported by the two
criteria defining the applicability of this principle-a legislative delegation of lawmaking power to an agency under a vague statutory standard and an express delegation to that agency of authority to implement its powers by rule. The legislature should have understood that a
delegation of lawmaking authority to an agency under a vague statutory standard would necessarily require significant agency refinement
and elaboration of that standard. Further express delegation to the
agency of rulemaking power appears to suggest that rulemaking should
be used as the principal surrogate for the legislature's inaction in further refining and elaborating the statutory standard. The fact that an
agency in such circumstances was also expressly or impliedly vested
with adjudicatory power is easily explained by the need to provide a
means by which the agency-created law could be enforced against particular violators. In the described situation, therefore, the vesting of adjudicatory power in an agency is not necessarily any indication that the
legislature was willing to permit the agency to elaborate the vague statutory standard primarily by order rather than by rule. Of course, if this
judicial assumption of legislative intention turns out to be unwarranted,
the legislature can quickly remedy it by statute.
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A better understanding of the justification, nature, and scope of the
judicially imposed rulemaking requirement in Oregon can be obtained
from an analysis of the principal Oregon Supreme Court case on the
subject. Megdal v. Oregon Board of Dental Examiners 61 required the
Oregon Supreme Court to review an order of the State Board of Dental
Examiners revoking Megdal's dental license on the ground that he had
engaged in "unprofessional conduct." 62 The conduct deemed "unprofessional" consisted of an intentional misrepresentation by Megdal when
he obtained malpractice insurance. In the process of securing the insurance, Megdal had stated that certain dentists were employed by him in
his Oregon practice when, in fact, they were employed by him in his
California practice. 63 Megdal argued that the "unprofessional conduct"
standard contained in the agency enabling act was too vague to be applied to him without prior agency elaboration of its specific contours by
rule. 64
The Oregon Supreme Court initially rejected a claim that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment required the agency to
elaborate the "unprofessional conduct" statutory standard by rule prior
to its application."" The court then determined that the legislature intended the Board to create its own more specific standards for "unprofessional conduct" rather than to rely upon more specific standards of
conduct currently recognized in that profession,"• or adopted by the legislature in the language of the statute. 67 Finally, the court concluded
that in creating more specific standards pursuant to this delegation of
lawmaking authority, the agency was required to do so primarily by
rule rather than by order because the legislature intended that result.
In justifying its conclusion that the Board was required to elaborate the statutory standard by rule prior to its application in a particular case, the Oregon Supreme Court first noted that the agency enabling act provided that the Board was expressly authorized to "make
and enforce rules ... for regulating the practice of dentistry."" 8 While
the enabling act did not unambiguously indicate that rules of the Board
must be used to give more specific content to the "unprofessional conduct" standard, "there are reasons to believe this is the legislative pol51. 288 Or. 293, 605 P.2d 273 (1980).
52. The enabling act explicitly authorized revocation of dental licenses for "unprofessional
conduct." See Or. Rev. Stat. §679.140 (l)(c) and (5)(d) (1987).
53. 288 Or. at 295, 605 P.2d at 274.
54. /d.
55. /d. at 296-303, 605 P.2d at 274-78.
56. /d. at 306, 605 P.2d at 280.
57. /d. at 308-11, 605 P.2d at 281-82.
58. /d. at 311, 605 P.2d at 282 (construing Or. Rev. Stat. §679.250 (7) (1987)).
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icy." 119 Those reasons included the need to assure fair notice to licensees
of the specific conduct that might cause loss of their licenses. 60 The
court went on to note that the legislature had made the policy of required rulemaking express in over thirty occupational licensing statutes, while it did not do so in the enabling act of the Board of Dental
Examiners. 61 It believed this fact to be irrelevant, however, because
"the difference of the potential impact, when one occupation is given
fair notice of obligatory standards of propriety by prior rulemaking and
another occupation is given no such prior notice, is too pronounced to
be attributed to the legislature without some showing that it was intended."62 As a result, the court concluded that the agency must elaborate the standard of "unprofessional conduct" primarily by rule, even
in the absence of an express legislative direction. Its conclusion was
based on the following principle: "[W]hen a licensing statute contains
both a broad standard of 'unprofessional conduct' that is not fully defined in the statute itself and also authority to make rules for the conduct of the regulated occupation, the legislative purpose is to provide
for the further specification of the standard by rules, unless a different
understanding is shown." 63
In light of this principle, the failure of the Board of Dental Examiners to issue rules further elaborating the statutory "unprofessional
conduct" standard and to proscribe by rule the type of conduct for
which Megdal's license had been revoked, was fatal. As a result, the
court held that the revocation of his license in these circumstances was
improper. 64 After all, "when the statute itself offers no further definition, the legislative delegation to the agency calls for such questions to
be resolved in principle by rules rather than being confronted and disputed for the first time in charging a particular respondent directly
under a conclusory term such as 'unprofessional conduct.' " 611
The court was careful, however, to make clear that it was not requiring the impossible. It pointed out that any requirement that the
agency "catalogue" by rule every kind of "professional misconduct"
might well be "infeasible." 66 As a consequence, the principle on which
the decision rested did not require rules imitating a "detailed criminal
59. /d.
60. /d.
61. /d. at 311-12, 605 P.2d at 282.
62. /d. at 313, 605 P.2d at 283.
63. /d. at 313-14, 605 P.2d at 283.
64. /d. at 321, 605 P.2d at 287.
65. /d. at 315, 605 P.2d at 284.
66. /d. at 314, 605 P.2d at 283-84 (quoting Board of Medical Examiners v. Mintz, 233 Or.
441, 448, 378 P.2d 945, 948 (1963)).
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code." 67 Instead, what was necessary was rulemaking adequate "to
serve the two purposes of giving notice of censurable conduct and confining disciplinary administration to the announced standards." 68 The
agency could accomplish its need to regulate adequately the profession
and to accomplish those purposes without resorting to unhelpful rules
containing a "catchall clause that is as general as the standard it purports to elucidate." 69 It could, for example, indicate the particular types
of relationships covered by the term "unprofessional conduct." In the
end, therefore, the Oregon Supreme Court required rulemaking in
these circumstances only as soon as feasible and to the extent
practicable.
Three members of the Oregon Supreme Court specially concurred
in the result of the Megdal case-but on grounds that were significantly different from those noted above. 70 These Justices agreed that
the Board of Dental Examiners should be required to elaborate the
statutory standard of "unprofessional conduct" by rule prior to proceeding against Megdal in a particular case. They disagreed, however,
with the imputed legislative intent analysis of the majority opinion. 71
The author of the concurring opinion stated that while he agreed the
Board was required to elaborate the statutory standard of "unprofessional conduct" by rules, it was "a fiction to hold that the statutory
scheme and legislative history" compelled that result. 72 His view was
that it is "more realistic to hold that the court, pursuant to its power to
review the decisions of the Board, is empowered to require the promulgation of such standards [by rule]." 73
To justify the conclusion that a reviewing court has authority to
create a common-law requirement that agencies must elaborate their
law primarily by rule rather than by order in circumstances where the
potential sanction for violation of a statutory standard is "severe," the
statutory standard is "particularly vague," and the standard is not illuminated by "a well understood meaning," 74 the concurring opinion initially relied upon a statement by Kenneth Culp Davis. Davis had written that a reviewing court had inherent authority to create a common
law requiring agencies to adopt "rules to guide the exercise of [their]
67. 288 Or. at 314, 605 P.2d at 284 (1980).
68. /d. at 314, 605 P.2d at 284.
69. /d.
70. !d. at 321-24, 605 P.2d at 287-88 (Denecke, C.J., Tongue and Peterson, JJ., specially
concurring).
71. /d.
72. !d. at 321, 605 P.2d at 287 (Denecke, C.J. concurring).
73. /d.
74. /d. at 323-24, 605 P.2d at 288.
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administrative discretion." 711 However, Davis did not mention any specific legitimating authority for that proposition other than the desirability of the result. The concurring opinion in Megdal also relied upon an
earlier Oregon Court of Appeals case for the conclusion that a court
could create this requirement wholly on the basis of its common-law
powers. 76 In Sun Ray Drive-In Dairy Inc. v. Oregon Liquor Control
Comm'n, 77 the intermediate appellate court of Oregon reviewed the
denial of a liquor license by a state agency. The agency had relied upon
a statute authorizing the denial of such a license if there were "sufficient licensed premises in the locality" and the license was not required
by the "public interest or convenience." 78 The court of appeals invalidated the action of the agency on the ground that the agency had not
previously adopted rules elaborating these broad and vague statutory
standards. 79 The court stated that a "legislative delegation of power in
broad statutory language such as the phrase 'demanded by public interest or convenience' places upon the administrative agency a responsibility to establish standards by which that law is to be applied. The legislature has provided for such rulemaking in the Administrative
Procedure Act." 80 A commentator has suggested a number of reasons
for the conclusion of the court in Sun Ray Dairy that the agency must
elaborate the statutory standard by rule before it may apply the standard in a particular case. Those reasons included the fact that
rulemaking:
(1) permitted public scrutiny of agency policy; (2) assured greater
public confidence; (3) permitted interested parties to be heard in the
formulation of policy; (4) permitted applicants to know in advance the
standards of consideration; (5) assured even-handed treatment; (6)
provided consistency in internal agency treatment of cases resolved
without litigation; (7) enabled parties and decision makers in a contested case to know what facts must be demonstrated or found; and
(8) minimized inconsistent, ad hoc, or ad hominim decisions. The
court also emphasized the key interrelationship between written standards and adequate scrutiny of agency decisions through informed
legislative oversight and probing judicial review. 81

75. /d. at 322, 605 P.2d at 288 (citing K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES
§ 6.13 at 225 (1976)).
76. Id.
77. 16 Or. App. 63, 517 P.2d 289 (1973).
78. Id. at 65, 517 P.2d at 290.
79. Id. at 70, 517 P.2d at 292.
80. Id. at 70, 517 P.2d at 292-93 (citations omitted).
81. Frohnmayer, supra note 36, at 442 (quoting Sun Ray Drive-In Dairy, Inc. v. Oregon
Liquor Control Comm'n, 16 Or. App. 63, 72-75, 517 P.2d 289, 293-94 (1973)).
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The court in Sun Ray Dairy did not, however, indicate the specific
source of its authority to require such rulemaking.
The concurring opinion in Megdal assumed that the order of the
court in Sun Ray Dairy prohibiting the agency from "act[ing] on the
application until it had adopted rules governing the issuance of licenses"82 was based entirely on a "common law principle" created by
that court in the exercise of its inherent judicial powers, rather than on
the putative intention of the legislature. 83 This assumption seems unjustified. As noted earlier, the opinion of the court in the Sun Ray
Dairy case did not indicate the precise source of its authority to require
such rulemaking. Consequently, the result in Sun Ray Dairy may be
viewed as resting upon a judicial assumption that the legislature impliedly intended the agency to elaborate the principal contours of that
vague statutory standard by rule rather than by order. If that is so, the
Sun Ray Dairy case is consistent with the approach of the Megdal majority opinion rather than with the approach of the Megdal concurring
opmwn.
Further support for the putative legislative intention approach of
the majority opinion in Megdal can also be found in the admission of
the concurring opinion in Megdal that "the legislature did not address
the issue of whether the Dental Board must promulgate rules defining
'unprofessional conduct.' " 84 Consequently, neither the relevant legislative history nor the relevant statutory text precluded the otherwise rational and functional assumption announced in the majority opinion
that the legislature would have intended the agency, in these circumstances, to elaborate the statutory standard primarily by rule, if it had
actually addressed the issue. The soundest conclusion, therefore, is that
reached by the majority rather than the concurring opinion in Megdal.
It should be stressed that court-required rulemaking that is based
upon an implied legislative intention has clearer legitimacy than court
required rulemaking that is based wholly on the inherent powers of the
judicial branch. This is so because the authority of the legislature to
require agencies to make law by rule rather than by order is much
clearer than the authority of the courts to impose such a requirement
on agencies entirely on the basis of the courts' inherent powers to assure the effectiveness of judicial review. 86 An implied legislative inten82. 288 Or. at 323, 605 P.2d at 288.
83. The concurring opinion in Megdal states that "[a]ttempting to reach the same result by
interpreting the statute in my opinion can result, as I think it has in this case, in a very strained
interpretation of a statute." /d.
84. /d. at 322, 605 P.2d at 287.
85. Professor Davis may also have suggested that courts have some inherent authority ancillary to their review powers over administrative action to require agencies in some situations to
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tion approach to this problem also has the virtue of inviting legislative
intervention in situations where the attributed legislative intention
proves to be misplaced; and it has the additional virtue of assigning to
the legislature an intention that is entirely reasonable and functional in
light of the special advantages of agency lawmaking by rule as compared to agency lawmaking by ad hoc order.
Broadly stated, the principle established by the Megdal case is
this: In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, the legislature is
presumed to intend an agency that has been delegated express authority
to issue rules and express or implied authority to decide individual
cases, subject to a vague statutory standard, to elaborate that statutory
standard by rule rather than by order, as soon as feasible and to the
extent practicable. This presumption would enable the courts, in the
absence of statutes expressly mandating that result, to require agencies
in such situations to elaborate the major contours of their law by
rulemaking rather than by adjudication, but only to the extent that
rulemaking is not disfunctional under the circumstances. However,
even when it is stated in these broad terms, the Megdal principle does
not fully satisfy the need for a general mandatory preference for agency
lawmaking by rule.
First, the Megdal principle appears to be limited to situations in
which agency lawmaking occurs pursuant to a statute containing a
vague standard and, therefore, it is inapplicable to a great deal of
engage in lawmaking by rule rather than by ad hoc order. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 7:26 at 131 (2d ed. 1979). The justification for the judicial imposition of such a
common law requirement wholly on the basis of inherent judicial power is unclear, but it may
relate to the need of reviewing courts to ascertain whether or not particular agency action is
consistent with agency law or practice and, therefore, is reasonable, or is inconsistent with agency
law or practice and, therefore, is arbitrary or capricious, within the meaning of the review standards incorporated in the agency enabling act or in the state administrative procedure act. In
addition, or in the alternative, the authority of a court to require agency rulemaking in some
situations may relate to a perception of inherent judicial power to ensure, generally, that agencies
act in a reasonable rather than in an arbitrary manner. The court, therefore, may have inherent
authority over an agency's choice of lawmaking modality since this very choice may be arbitrary or
capricious in particular circumstances.
In any event, in addition to the Megdal concurring opinion, a number of state cases hint at
the existence of a common law judicial power to require agency lawmaking by rule in particular
circumstances. Other cases state that courts have the power to impose rulemaking requirements in
particular circumstances. These cases do not indicate any source for this judicial authority over
agency lawmaking, thereby creating the inference that such authority derives from inherent judicial powers. One such case may be Boller Beverages, Inc. v. Davis, 38 N.J. 138, 155, 183 A.2d 64,
73 (1962), (stating that the agency must "in all fairness, bottom an alleged violation on general
legislation before ... [it] may rule in a particular case" in situations where the "agency has been
given full rule-making power."). However, Boller Beverages can be explained on a basis other
than the inherent common law power of a court to require an agency to engage in lawmaking by
rule rather than lawmaking by order in such circumstances. See supra note 49.
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agency lawmaking that occurs under statutory standards that are not of
that character. Second, the Megdal principle is also apparently limited
to situations in which the agency delegated lawmaking authority under
a vague statutory standard has expressly been delegated authority to
implement its powers by rule and, therefore, it is inapplicable to a
great deal of agency lawmaking that occurs in situations where
rulemaking powers may only be implied. However, because the
rulemaking requirement of Megdal is based upon an assumed legislative intention, the vague statutory standard and the express delegation
of rulemaking authority may be desirable or even essential criteria in
light of the need to justify the reasonableness of that assumption. In
any case, to the extent these limitations on the otherwise desirable
Megdal doctrine persist, they indicate that it is not a fully satisfactory
substitute for a more broad-scoped mandatory preference for agency
lawmaking by rule.
Even more disappointing than the inadequacy of an expansive
reading of the Megdal doctrine for present purposes is the failure of the
Oregon Supreme Court to read that doctrine as expansively as it might
have. Indeed, the recent Oregon Supreme Court case of Trebesch v.
Employment Division 86 may have narrowed the potential applicability
of the rule of construction first announced in Megdal. If this is so, it is
unfortunate, and further supports the urgent need for a statutory solution to this problem.
In Trebesch the issue was whether the agency "was required to
promulgate a rule defining the statutory phrase 'systematic and sustained effort to obtain work' before it could deny claimant extended
unemployment benefits for failing to fulfill the statutory requirement."87 Although the court's resolution of the issue in this particular
case was ambiguous, 88 its analysis and elaboration of the Megdal principle suggests an unwillingness to engage in its broad generalization.
After identifying the issue in Trebesch, the court noted that the answer
to this question could not be found in the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, in a common law of judicial review, or in any
86. 300 Or. 264, 710 P.2d 136 (1985).
87. Jd. at 266, 710 P.2d at 137.
88. The court held that if the responsible agency official
perceive[s] himself to have comprehensive review powers to consider interpretations of
law ... the term must be interpreted by rule and the absence of a rule before application to this claimant would compel reversal. On the other hand, [if he does not have
such powers, he] may address the standards required for an adequate work search by
order on reconsideration in light of the facts of this case.
Id. at 277, 710 P.2d at 143.
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provision of the state Administrative Procedure Act. 89 "Rather, the answer is a matter of statutory interpretation, the relevant statutes being
those regulating the particular agency whose action is challenged."90
The role of the courts was to explain the "methodology" by which one
may determine whether the legislature intended the agency to engage in
lawmaking by rule rather than by order in a particular situation. 91
Trebesch began its analysis of the Megdal principle by noting that
the case "does not mean that all [statutory] terms delegating policymaking discretion [to an agency] can be applied only after rulemaking." 92
The legislature may, of course, expressly require an agency to elaborate
a particular statutory term by rule prior to its application in a particular case. 93 When that happens, the job of the court is easy. However,
absent such an express directive,
the breadth and kind of responsibility delegated to the agency by the
statutory term (fact-finding, applying an ambiguous law, or developing policy) will be one, but not a dispositive, factor which may indicate an implicit directive from the legislature for rulemaking. In addition, the tasks the agency is responsible for accomplishing, and the
structure by which the agency performs its mandated tasks, all of
which are specified in an agency's authorizing legislation, must be
examined as a whole in order to discern the legislature's intent with
regard to rulemaking. 94
Therefore, in the Trebesch case, the Oregon Supreme Court construed the Megdal principle to mean that in situations where the legislature has not expressly indicated its intentions with respect to
mandatory agency rulemaking, courts must determine those intentions
by analyzing a number of factors. These factors include "the character
of the statutory term," "the authority delegated and the tasks assigned
to the agencies," and "the structure by which the agencies execute their
tasks." 911 While the Court does not explain exactly how these factors
are to be applied, the court is clear that they must all be considered in
an effort to ascertain the legislature's putative intention.
One can hardly object to the fairness of this multi-factored, contextual approach to assigning a putative legislative intention with respect
89. /d. at 267, 710 P.2d at 137-38.
90. /d. at 267, 710 P.2d at 138. The court noted that the state administrative procedure act
only provided uniform procedures for the making of rules rather than mandating a preference for
agency lawmaking by rule.
91. /d.
92. /d. at 270, 710 P.2d at 139.
93. /d.
94. /d., (emphasis added).
95. !d. at 270, 710 P.2d 139-40.
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to the duty of an agency to engage in lawmaking by rule when the
relevant statutes do not expressly resolve that question. But it should be
noted that this approach would substitute a full-scale, particularized
inquiry producing unpredictable and inconsistent results, for a broad
rule of construction based on Megdal that would be easier to apply and
that would yield relatively predictable and consistent results. In light of
the significant advantages of rulemaking over adjudication for agency
lawmaking, courts would be warranted in conveying the following message to the legislature: Whenever statutes are facially silent with respect to the obligation of a particular agency to elaborate a vague statutory term by rule rather than by order, courts will assume that the
legislature intended the agency to do so, as soon as feasible and to the
extent practicable, by rule, in all situations in which the legislature
explicitly vested the agency with rulemaking authority. If the legislature does not believe that principle of construction is accurate generally,
or in particular situations, it can alter it by statute. But unless the legislature does so, such a principle of construction is more reasonable,
functional, and practical than a multi-factored, in-depth analysis of
probable legislative intent on this question of the kind adopted by the
recent Trebesch case.

C.

Due Process Requirement

The highest courts of several states have suggested another possible basis for a judicially imposed preference for agency lawmaking by
rule. They have indicated that in some circumstances the failure of an
agency to elaborate its law by rule prior to the application of that law
in a particular case may constitute a denial of due process. The Colorado Supreme Court actually invalidated particular agency action on
due process grounds because it was convinced that the agency's failure
to elaborate its law by rule was so unfair in the circumstances as to be
unconstitutional. In Elizondo v. Department of Revenue, 96 the Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the action of the Motor Vehicle Division
of the State Department of Revenue suspending Elizondo's driver's license and denying his request for a probationary license during the
suspension period. 97 The statute authorizing the Department to issue
probationary licenses during a suspension did not indicate the criteria
the Department should use when it determined whether to issue probationary licenses in particular cases. 98 The Department was authorized,

96. 194 Colo. 113, 570 P.2d 518 (1977).
97. ld. at 115, 570 P.2d at 519-20.
98. Id. at 116, 570 P.2d at 520.
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but not required, by its enabling act to issue rules to facilitate the execution of its licensing functions. Despite this authority, the Department
had issued no rules to guide its hearing officers when they decided
whether to grant or deny probationary drivers' licenses. 99
The Supreme Court of Colorado held in Elizondo that "due process requires ... the Department of Revenue [to] promulgate rules ...
to guide hearing officers in their decisions regarding requests for probationary licenses," and that "these rules ... must be sufficiently specific
to inform the public what factors will be considered relevant by Department hearing officers, so that requests for probationary licenses
may be supported by relevant evidence and arguments." 100 This conclusion was justified in these circumstances because the Department's failure to issue rules specifying the criteria for the issuance or denial of a
probationary license
has left the granting or denial of probationary drivers' licenses solely
to the unfettered discretion of individual hearing officers. As a result,
neither the public nor the courts have any means of knowing in advance what evidence might be considered material to any particular
decision. Nor is there any assurance that each hearing officer will not,
consciously or subconsciously, follow standards quite different from
those applied by his or her colleagues. 101

As a result, the situation was so unfair that it amounted to an unconstitutional denial of due process of law. The court in Elizondo cited no
United States Supreme Court cases to support its conclusion that the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment required the Department to structure the agency's discretion to issue probationary licenses
by rule rather than by ad hoc order. However, the Colorado Supreme
Court did cite a number of lower federal court cases 102 and two state
supreme court cases as a basis for such a requirement. 103
Elizondo appears to be correct that in some situations an agency's
previous failure to elaborate its law by rule may be so unfair as to
99. /d. See also id. at 118; 570 P.2d at 521 ("By failing to follow that statutory suggestion"
that it issue rules confining its discretion, the Department acted so unfairly as to violate due
process) (emphasis supplied).
100. !d. at 118-19, 570 P.2d at 522.
101. /d. at 118, 570 P.2d at 521.
102. Id. at 118-19, 570 P.2d at 522 (citing Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d
262 (2d Cir. 1968); Barnes v. Merritt, 376 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1967); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d
605 (5th Cir. 1964); City of Santa Clara v. Kleppe, 418 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Cal. 1976); EakerChaput v. Cammett, 406 F. Supp. 1134 (D.N.H. 1976); St. Augustine High School v. Louisiana
High School Athletic Ass'n, 270 F. Supp. 767 (E.D. La. 1967); Smith v. Ladner, 288 F. Supp. 66
(S.D. Miss. 1966)).
103. !d. (citing City of Atlanta v. Hill, 238 Ga. 413, 233 S.E.2d 193 (1977); Pennsylvania
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Cohen, 448 Pa. 189, 292 A.2d 277 (1972)).
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preclude specific agency action against a person in a particular case.
But it would be a mistake to conclude that the fourteenth amendment
due process clause requires state agencies to elaborate all delegations to
them of lawmaking authority under vague statutory standards by rule
rather than by ad hoc decision before they may be exercised in particular cases. The Alaska Supreme Court has noted, for example, that
"[t]he process of making new law in the course of an administrative
adjudication does not constitute a per se violation of due process," and
that "[t]he adequacy of process does not [necessarily] depend on the
advance adoption of standards." 104 The Alaska Supreme Court has also
indicated, however, that it would require agency elaboration of its law
by rule "to the extent necessary to assure a fair administrative process."1011 But it has not indicated when a "fair administrative process"
might require such rulemaking except to note that "vagueness or lack
of notice" might in particular circumstances induce that result. 106
The majority opinion in the Oregon Megdal case is also instructive in this regard. The court in that case rejected the claim that the
revocation of an occupational license on the grounds of "unprofessional
conduct" was a violation of due process in a situation where that vague
statutory term had not been further defined by agency rules. 107 In dealing with the due process issue, the Megdal court noted that due process
prohibited the imposition of penal sanctions for the violation of an excessively vague law, and that it prohibited the retrospective creation of
crimes. 108 Consequently, agency lawmaking that is the basis for imposing penal sanctions must be executed by rule to the extent necessary to
provide fair notice of the specific conduct subject to punishment, and to
the extent necessary to avoid the ex post facto creation of criminal conduct. However, these arguments for requiring administrative lawmaking by rule rather than by ad hoc order are applicable only to the administration of laws whose violations are subject to penal sanctions.
They are not helpful tools with which to require administrative lawmaking by rule in schemes that cannot be characterized as penal. 109
Nevertheless, the Oregon court in Megdal admitted there was
some support for the proposition "that a prior specification of grounds
should be a prerequisite of due process in administrative as well as
104. Amerada Hess Pipeline Corp. v. Alaska Pub. Util. Comm'n, 711 P.2d 1170, 1178
(Alaska 1986).
105. Id.
106. /d.
107. Megdal v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, 288 Or. 293, 296-303, 605 P.2d
273, 27 4-78 (1980).
108. /d. at 299, 605 P.2d at 276.
109. /d. at 300, 605 P.2d at 276.
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penal deprivations." 110 It also recognized that the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had joined together two otherwise unrelated propositions-the notion that a penal statute must provide fair notice of the
conduct it prohibits and the notion that access to a governmentally regulated occupation is protected by due processm-to produce a new
principle. According to that principle, the grounds to revoke an occupational license "for 'grossly unprofessional conduct' must be limited to
those further spelled out in the statute or in [agency] rules, because
'revocation of licenses and permits for conduct not specifically defined
or prohibited by the statute, would render the statute unconstitutional
on grounds of vagueness in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' " 112 But the majority opinion in the Oregon
Megdal case noted that there was no support in the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court for the conclusion of the Pennsylvania
court that the standards utilized in the administration of occupational
110. /d. at 301, 605 P.2d at 277 (citing K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES 28, 224 (1976), and Note, Due Process Limitations on Occupational Licensing, 59 VA. L.
REV. 1097, 1104-06 (1973)).
111. 288 Or. at 301, 605 P.2d at 277 (construing Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Cohen, 448 Pa. 189, 292 A.2d 277 (1972)).
112. /d. (citing Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Cohen, 448 Pa. 189, 198-99, 292
A.2d 277, 282 (1982) ).
This case held invalid an order of the Board of Pharmacy suspending a pharmacist's license
for one year and revoking indefinitely his pharmacist's permit. See id. The pharmacist in question
did not violate any of the thirteen specific grounds constituting "grossly unprofessional conduct"
that were listed in the agency's enabling act or any rules of the agency. /d. at 195-96, 292 A.2d at
280. The court held, first, that the thirteen specific grounds constituting "grossly unprofessional
conduct" were intended by the legislature to be exhaustive and, therefore, the agency could not
add to them by any further lawmaking on the basis of the statutory term "unprofessional conduct." See id. at 196-98, 292 A.2d at 280-81. The court held, second, that the agency could
suspend or revoke licenses for additional reasons "upon proof of violation of any properly adopted
rules ... promulgated by the Board." /d. at 197-98, 292 A.2d at 281. But, the court noted, it was
"only by means of these statutorily granted rule-making powers that the Legislature has empowered the Board to provide additional grounds for sanctions," and the Board had not done so. /d. at
198, 292 A.2d at 281-82. The result in this Pennsylvania case, therefore, was wholly a product of
statutory interpretation rather than a requirement of due process.
However, in deciding that the legislature had limited the Board's authority to suspend or to
revoke such licenses to those enumerated in the agency enabling act and to those enumerated in its
rules, the court indicated that this construction of the agency enabling act was influenced by constitutional considerations. The court stated that the creation of additional grounds for license suspension or revocation through retroactive agency lawmaking by adjudication would present serious
due process, fair notice, and void-for-vagueness problems. See id. at 198, 199, 292 A.2d at 282. In
arriving at that conclusion the court stressed that the licensing statute in question imposed "sanctions" and, therefore, "must satisfy the requirements of notice and a clear description of what is
prohibited conduct [imposed] on all penal statutes by the Fourteenth Amendment." /d. at 199, 292
A.2d at 282. That is why it concluded that "[t}he function of prohibiting new conduct or practices
in the pharmacy profession rests with the Legislature or with the Board through its rule-making
authority." /d. at 202, 292 A.2d at 284.
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licensing laws "must meet those for penal laws." 113 The court in
Megdal did note that there were some lower federal court cases that
might be viewed as requiring agencies delegated lawmaking authority
of a nonpenal nature under a vague statutory term to elaborate that
term by rule before they sought to apply it in particular cases. 114 N evertheless, it deemed these cases to be "inconclusive" and refused to find
that the Board of Dental Examiners had acted unconstitutionally because it revoked Megdal's license on the grounds of "unprofessional
conduct" in the absence of agency rules further refining the meaning of
that statutory term. 1111
However, on the basis of the cases deemed "inconclusive" by the
court in the Oregon Megdal case, Kenneth Culp Davis has argued that
"[t]he law may be in the early stages of a massive movement toward
judicially required rulemaking that will reduce discretion that is unguided by rules or precedents." 116 This new law will allow agencies
that use systems of precedents to continue to rely upon them rather
than rules. On the other hand, "agencies without systems of precedents
may be judicially required to use their rulemaking power to provide
guiding standards." 117 The purpose of the development described by
Davis is to ensure that agencies structure the exercise of their discretionary powers by the adoption of standards that will reduce the likelihood that those powers will be exercised in a wholly arbitrary manner.
Davis notes that this development could be partly based on the idea
that "in some circumstances the lack of rules or standards is so unreasonable that due process is denied." 118 For this proposition he cites several cases decided by the United States Court of Appeals.
The first of these lower federal court cases cited by Davis was
Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority. 119 That case involved a
state agency that processed a huge volume of applications for public
housing. In doing so, the agency denied approximately eight applications for each one granted. 120 Yet, the agency had no ascertainable stan113. 288 Or. at 302, 605 P.2d at 277.
114. See id. at 303, 605 P.2d at 278 (citing Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir.
1969) (university must develop "misconduct" standards for expelling students); Holmes v. New
York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, (2d Cir. 1968) (agency must develop standards for grant
and denial of public housing); White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976) (agency must
develop standards for eligibility for public assistance); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 610 (5th
Cir. 1964) (city must develop standards for the grant and denial of liquor licenses).
115. See id.
116. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 7:26 at 128 (2d ed. 1979).
117. /d.
118. /d. at 131.
119. 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968).
120. /d. at 263.
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dards of any kind to guide the exercise of its discretion. The court held
that "due process requires [in these circumstances] that selections
among applicants be made m accordance with 'ascertainable
standards.' " 121
However, the Holmes case does not necessarily require, as a matter of due process, agency creation of these standards by rule rather
than by a reliance upon a system of precedents created in individual
cases. While it may be possible to infer a rulemaking requirement from
the opinion of the court, that inference is not mandatory. The same is
true of a number of other lower federal court cases that rely upon the
requirements of due process in order to force agencies to create standards to govern the exercise of their discretionary powers. While these
cases may require the agencies involved to create such standards to ensure that the agencies do not exercise their discretionary powers in a
wholly unstructured and arbitrary manner, they do not appear to require those standards to be created by rule rather than by a system of
precedents created in individual cases. 122 And it should be noted that
the reliance of agencies upon a system of precedents, as well as on
rules, establishing standards governing their discretion, can go a long
way towards securing the due process objective of these cases-the
elimination of entirely random, unpredictable, unprincipled, and capricious, low visibility agency decisionmaking in particular cases.
On the other hand, some lower federal court cases may more
clearly suggest that a due process, administrative standards requirement
can only be satisfied by the issuance of rules. For example, White v.
Roughton 123 involved the validity of an administrator's action in denying or terminating financial assistance to individuals claiming benefits
under an established program of the public body involved. No written
standards governed the eligibility for such aid or the amounts that
would be made available in particular cases. Instead, the administrator
and his staff determined eligibility and the amount of benefits on the
basis of "their own unwritten personal standards." 124 In these circumstances, the court held that the lack of written standards vested "virtually unfettered discretion" in the administrator and his staff and, therefore "is clearly violative of due process." 1211 It insisted that "[f]air and
121. Jd. at 265.
122. See, e.g., Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1964); Environmental Defense
Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 596-98 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
123. 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976).
124. Jd. at 754.
125. Jd.
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consistent application of such [eligibility] requirements requires that
[the administrator] establish written standards and regulations." 126
Another case that is worth mentioning in this connection is Soglin
v. Kauffman. 127 The issue in that case was whether a public university
could suspend particular students for non-academic "misconduct" without having previously elaborated the specific content of that term by
rule. The court held that the university could not do so because the
term "misconduct," unaided by "rules" that would have increased its
particularity, was void for vagueness as a matter of due process. 128 Soglin is clear that "such sanctions [as suspension or expulsion must] be
administered in accord with preexisting rules." 129 However, the case
does not stand for the more general proposition that agencies must
structure their discretion by rule rather than by a system of individual
case precedents in all circumstances where due process may require
them to create operating standards in order to avoid arbitrary action.
The reason for this conclusion is that the court in Soglin unambiguously treated the university disciplinary proceeding as a penal proceeding, noting specifically that "[t]he use of 'misconduct' [alone] as a standard in imposing the penalties threatened here" violates the
requirements of due process of law. 130 By analogizing the university
disciplinary proceeding in question to the criminal process and the due
process, void-for-vagueness requirements applicable to the criminal
process, the court limited the applicability of the Soglin case to other
situations in which the administrative process is being used for clearly
penal rather than regulatory purposes.
The United States Supreme Court has not confirmed the general
thesis that due process may require agencies operating outside of the
penal process to structure their discretion by rule rather than by a system of individual case precedents so as to assure fair notice to persons
who may be affected and to avoid wholly arbitrary administrative action. Indeed, the discussion in Part II of this Article of the principal
United States Supreme Court cases dealing with the discretion of agencies to choose the modality by which they make law, appears to demonstrate that such a general thesis is unlikely to be received warmly in
that quarter. As noted, there are also few (if any) lower federal court
decisions that would unambiguously support this thesis, although a significant number of lower federal court cases seem to agree that, in par126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Jd.
418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969).
Jd. at 168.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
Jd. (emphasis supplied).
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ticular circumstances, the risk of arbitrary agency decisionmaking without further elaboration of the standards or criteria used by an agency to
exercise its discretion may be so high as to be unfair in a due process
sense.
Consequently, it is unlikely that due process doctrine will generally require agencies operating outside of any penal process to elaborate
their law primarily by rule rather than by order. Due process, therefore, does not appear to be a promising substitute for a legislative solution to the problem addressed by this Article. At best, due process may
require agencies to elaborate their law by rule rather than by order in
some rare instances where the agency process is of a nonpenal character. The inertia of existing law on this subject and the strong presumption of the validity of agency action 131 are likely to minimize the number of situations in which agencies are required by due process to make
their law primarily by rule. Those situations are also likely to be very
unpredictable as well as infrequent.
The reason for that unpredictability is the methodology currently
used by the courts to determine whether particular procedures employed by an agency are so unfair as to violate due process. The applicable methodology requires a court to engage in a balancing process in
which it considers three factors:
[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail. 132

One conclusion seems inevitable with respect to the application of these
amorphous factors to a particular situation in order to determine
whether the agency involved must elaborate its law in that context primarily by rule. In practice, the application of these factors is likely to
yield results that are very hard to predict beyond the justified assump131. See, e.g., United States v. Chemical Found., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926); Transcentury
Properties, Inc. v. State, 41 Cal. App. 3d 835, 843-44, 116 Cal. Rptr. 487, 492 (1974); Colorado
Health Facilities Review Council v. District Court, 689 P.2d 617, 623 (Col. 1984) (en bane);
Mathiasen v. State Conservation Comm'n, 246 Iowa 905, 910, 70 N.W.2d 158, 161 (1955); New
England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Uti!. Comm'n, 448 A.2d 272, 279 (Me. 1982); Taub v. Pirnie,
3 N.Y.2d 188, 195, 144 N.E.2d 3,6, 165 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5, (1957). See also 2 F. CooPER, STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 450, 451 (1965); 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 11.04,
at 56 n.34, § 11.06 (1958); C. KocH, jR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.28 (1985);
29 AM. juR. 2d Evidence § 172 (1962).
132. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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tion that the odds are overwhelmingly in favor of an affirmance of the
agency's determination because of the existing general state of the law
on this subject, and the strong presumption in favor of the validity of
agency action. 133 So, while due process may be of some marginal utility
in efforts to increase agency lawmaking by rule, it is not an effective
tool with which to establish a clear mandatory general preference for
administrative rulemaking.

D.

Abuse of Discretion

The typical state administrative procedure act provides that a
court may reverse agency adjudicative action if it is "arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion." 134 In addition, reviewing courts are often expressly or impliedly authorized to set aside agency action on that basis
by particular agency enabling acts and by the inherent judicial powers
vested in state courts by the state constitution or the common law. As a
result, reviewing courts may be called upon to determine whether an
agency's use of adjudication rather than rulemaking to announce new
law was "arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." While the implementation of this judicial review standard may result in a court imposing a preference for agency lawmaking by rule in some particular
situations, those situations will be very rare and narrowly defined.
There are two reasons for this conclusion. First, a strong presumption
of validity normally attaches to agency action. 13& Second, state courts
have almost always upheld as reasonable exercises of agency authority
the choices of agencies in particular circumstances to develop their law
by ad hoc order rather than by rulemaking. Nevertheless, a number of
state and federal courts operating under similar judicial review standards136 have suggested that there are situations in which agency lawmaking by order rather than by rule would be an abuse of discretion.
For example, several state courts have indicated that while agencies have broad discretion in choosing the lawmaking modality to be
used in particular situations, the courts will review an agency's choice
in order to ensure that the agency did not abuse its discretion or act
133. See sources cited supra note 131.
134. See 1961 MSAPA, supra note 19 § 15(g)(6) at 430-31. The acts of most states are
based on the 1961 MSAPA. 14 U.L.A. 357 (1980).
135. See sources cited supra note 131.
136. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A) (1983), for the similar standard to be applied by federal
courts when they review federal agency action: "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion."
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arbitrarily or capriciously. 187 However, in the particular cases in which
these state courts indicated their willingness to review, on an abuse of
discretion standard, an agency's choice to elaborate its law on a caseby-case basis in adjudication rather than by rulemaking, they almost
always upheld the action of the agency, and did so on a perfunctory
basis. 188 Only one state case, other than those discussed earlier in this
section under the statutory construction and due process categories, actually holds an agency's choice to engage in lawmaking by ad hoc order
rather than by rulemaking to be an abuse of discretion on the particular facts before the court. That case is not helpful because the precise
basis for the court's conclusion that the state agency abused its discretion in deciding to proceed by adjudication is unclear. 139
137. Potts v. Bennett, 487 So. 2d 919, 921-22 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985) (agency's choice to
proceed by adjudication was not arbitrary or unjust); Town of Brookline v. Commissioner of the
Dep't of Envtl. Quality Eng'g, 387 Mass. 372, 379-80, 439 N.E.2d 792, 799 (1982) (agency's
choice to proceed by adjudication was not an abuse of discretion); Bunge Corp. v. Commission of
Revenue, 305 N.W.2d 779,785 (Minn. 1981) (agency's choice to proceed by adjudication was not
arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of discretion); 613 Corp. v. Division of State Lottery, 210 N.J.
Super. 485, 493, 510 A.2d 103, 111 (1986) (agency's choice to proceed by adjudication was an
abuse of discretion).
138. See cases cited supra note 137.
139. 613 Corp. v. Division of State Lottery, 210 N.J. Super. at 485,510 A.2d at 103 (1986).
It held that the agency abused its discretion when it denied a lottery ticket vendor's license to a
particular applicant on the basis of the controversial nature of the applicant's principal business,
because the agency had not previously issued a rule embodying such a policy. Id. at 500, 510 A.2d
at 111. The precise basis for the court's conclusion that the agency abused its discretion by proceeding on the basis of adjudication rather than by rulemaking to establish this policy is unclear.
It is possible that the court in this case decided only that the agency had established a de facto
rule in the form of a policy of "general applicability" and "continuing effect," id. at 498, 510
A.2d at 110, denying licenses on that ground, ("It appears likely that a policy of denying licenses
to what the Lottery deems 'controversial enterprises' has been established," id. at 497, 510 A.2d at
109), and, therefore, that the failure of the agency to make such a de facto policy de jure by
issuing a formal rule after following required rulemaking procedures was improper, ("If an
agency determination constitutes an 'administrative rule,' it must comply with the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act to be valid," id. at 498, 510 A.2d at 110). If so,
this case is similar to a number of other New Jersey cases invalidating an agency's action in an
adjudication because the agency had issued a policy of general applicability and continuing effect-a de facto rule-that it had not made de jure by following required rulemaking procedures.
See cases cited supra note 49.
It is also possible, however, that this intermediate appellate court concluded, on the basis of a
misreading of an earlier state supreme court decision, (see Boller Beverages, Inc. v. Davis, 38
N.J. 138, 183 A.2d 64 (1962), discussed supra note 49), that an agency "delegated full rulemaking power. . must bottom an alleged violation on general legislation [an agency rule] before it
can. . [decide a particular case]," 210 N .]. Super. at 498, 510 A.2d at 110, and that an agency
in such circumstances may not proceed wholly on the basis of adjudication unless it demonstrates
that it must do so in order "to respond to specialized or unforseen problems," id. at 499, 510 A.2d
at 110, which were not present in the instant case, id. at 499-500, 510 A.2d at 110-11. Or, the
holding of this case may have been based on a misreading by this intermediate appellate court of
another earlier state supreme court decision, (see Texter v. Department of Human Serv., 88 N.J.
376, 443 A.2d 178 (1982), discussed supra note 49), for the proposition that "where the subject
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Some federal cases have more clearly suggested particular circumstances in which federal agencies would abuse their discretion if they
proceeded to elaborate their law by ad hoc order rather than by rule.
After noting that agencies normally have broad discretion to choose the
means of lawmaking modality employed in particular contexts, the
United States Supreme Court indicated in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co. 140 that an agency might have to proceed by rule rather than by
order in three situations: if "the adverse consequences" of retroactive
lawmaking are so substantial because of past reliance on prior agency
decisions "that the ... [agency] should be precluded from reconsidering
the issue in an adjudicative proceeding;" if "some new liability is
sought to be imposed on individuals for past actions that were taken in
good-faith reliance on ... [agency] pronouncements;" or if the imposition of fines or damages was involved. 141 There is no other clear indication from the United States Supreme Court of circumstances in which
agencies engaged in lawmaking without penal consequences would
abuse their discretion if they chose adjudication rather than rulemaking
for this purpose. There are, however, a number of lower federal court
cases that have spoken on the subject.
The most important of these cases is Ford Motor Company v.
Federal Trade Commission, 142 a decision of the United States Court of
Appeals. In Ford Motor Co. the Federal Trade Commission had challenged, in a particular agency adjudication, the lawfulness of certain
practices of an automobile dealer in repossessing cars from defaulting
purchasers. 143 That adjudication was the first agency action against a
dealer for such conduct; and it was clear that industry practice had
been to do what the dealer involved in this case had done. 144 The court
held that the decision of the agency to proceed by adjudication rather
than by rulemaking was an abuse of discretion because "the rule of the
case made below will have general application. It will not apply just to
Francis Ford. Credit practices similar to those of Francis Ford are wide
spread in the car dealership industry." 145 In short, even though the
matter of a quasi-judicial adjudication encompasses concerns that transcend those of individual
litigants ... rulemaking procedures should be followed." /d. at 498-99, 510 A.2d at 110. In any
case, to the extent the latter basis for finding an abuse of discretion in agency lawmaking by
adjudication differs from the first basis, it will be discussed in the context of more explicit federal
case law on the subject. See infra text accompanying notes 142-53.
140. 416 u.s. 267 (1974).
141. Id. at 295.
142. 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 (1982). See generally Berg,
supra note 18.
143. 673 F.2d at 1008-09.
144. Id. at 1009-10.
145. /d. at 1110.
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Federal Trade Commission had issued an order through appropriate
adjudicatory procedures that was directed solely at the parties involved
in the particular case, the court held the agency had abused its discretion because it should have proceeded by rulemaking rather than by
adjudication to establish the new law in question.
Ford Motor Co. appears to hold "that an agency action which
changes existing law and has widespread application [in its ultimate
effect] must be accomplished through rulemaking and not by adjudication,"148 and that if an agency seeks to engage in lawmaking with that
effect by means of adjudication, the agency abuses its discretion. Ford
Motor Co. relied on an earlier United States Court of Appeals case,
Patel v. I.N.S., 147 for the proposition that "agencies can proceed by
adjudication to enforce discrete violations of existing laws where the
effective scope of the rules impact will be relatively small; but an
agency must proceed by rulemaking if it seeks to change the law and
establish rules of widespread application .... " 148
There are a number of difficulties with the conclusion that an
agency abuses its discretion whenever the agency uses adjudication
rather than rulemaking to engage in lawmaking in these circumstances.
First, as Davis notes, the principal proposition asserted in the Ford
Motor Co. case
that "an agency must proceed by rulemaking if it seeks to change the
law and establish rules of widespread application" ... is truly spectacular because (a) no previous law supports it, (b) both courts and
agencies have at all stages in their development changed law through
adjudication even when such law is of widespread application, and (c)
the proposition is directly contrary to two prominent Supreme Court
holdings, ... S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp, and ... NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. 149

Second, no special circumstances appear in the Ford Motor Co. case
that would justify the action of the court in setting aside as an abuse of
discretion that particular decision of the agency to engage in ad hoc
lawmaking by order rather than by rule. 15° Consequently, Davis appears to be correct when he states that federal law does not support the
abuse of discretion principle concerning an agency's choice of lawmak146. See Berg, supra note 18, at 155. See also K. DAVIS, 1982 SUPPLEMENT TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:25 (2d ed. 1979, Supp. 1982) [hereinafter DAVIS, 1982 SUPP.].
147. 638 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1980). The case is criticized in DAVIS, 1982 SUPP., supra note
146 at 180.
148. 673 F.2d at 1009.
149. See DAVIS, 1982 SuPP., supra note 146 at 181-82.
150. See Berg, supra note 18, at 158-60.
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ing modality that was enunciated by the Ford Motor Co. case, and that
federal law should not do so. un
It is hard to justify the Ford Motor Co. principle as a defensible
application of the "arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse
of discretion" standard of judicial review. After all, the courts have repeatedly held that agencies have broad discretion to choose the method
by which they elaborate their law in circumstances where they have
been delegated authority to do so either by rule or by order; and a
strong presumption of validity attaches to agency action. The fact that
agency rulemaking is a more desirable means of changing existing law
in circumstances in which that change will affect many people does not
suggest, absent special circumstances, that an agency vested with broad
discretion to choose either means of lawmaking can be demonstrated to
have abused its discretion, or to have acted arbitrarily or capriciously, if
it instead issues an otherwise de jure adjudicatory order with that effect. Cases in at least one state express a similar view. The Florida
Supreme Court has indicated that while "[a]dministrative agencies are
not required to institute rulemaking procedures each time a new policy
is developed, ... that form of proceeding is preferable where established industry-wide policy is being altered." 1112 The American Bar Association has also suggested the desirability of such agency action in
these circumstances recognizing, however, that the existing state of the
law cannot reasonably be construed to require that result in the absence
of special circumstances. 1113
151. See DAVIS, 1982 SuPP., supra note 146 at 183.
152. Florida Cities Water v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 384 So. 2d 1280, 1281 (Fla. 1980)
(emphasis added). See also Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Indiantown Tel & Tel., 435 So. 2d 892,
895 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
153. The Council of the American Bar Association formulated the following resolution which
was subsequently adopted by the ABA House of Delegates:
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association approves the following principles
respecting the choice between rulemaking and adjudication in administrative agency
proceeding:
1.
An agency is generally free to announce new policy through an adjudicative
proceeding.
2.
When rulemaking is feasible and practicable, an agency which has been granted
broad rulemaking authority ordinarily should use rulemaking rather than adjudication for large-scale changes, such as proscribing established industry-wide practices not previously thought to be unlawful.
3. An agency should not be empowered to treat its adjudicatory decisions precisely as
if they were rules. In particular, it is inappropriate to empower an agency or court
to treat third-party departures from holdings in agency adjudications as, ipso facto,
violations of law. Where the precedent of a prior adjudication is sought to be
applied in a subsequent adjudication, a party should have a meaningful opportunity to persuade the agency that the principle involved should be modified or held
inapplicable to his situation.
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In sum, then, the "abuse of discretion" standard cannot be read to
require agencies to use rulemaking rather than adjudication whenever
they change the existing state of the law in a way that will have an
impact of widespread application through the doctrine of stare decisis.
This conclusion is justified in light of the strong presumption of validity
of agency action, the broad discretion vested in most agencies to choose
their lawmaking modality in particular circumstances, and the overwhelming number of cases upholding the propriety of agency choices on
that subject. And even if the "abuse of discretion" standard could be
read in this way by state courts, application of that standard would not
solve the problem to which this paper is addressed because it would not
require agencies delegated authority to engage in lawmaking by order
as well as by rule to prefer rulemaking for all such lawmaking as soon
as feasible and to the extent practicable. Instead, application of this
standard would only require agencies to use rulemaking rather than
adjudication for some narrower subset of situations. Therefore, it is not
an adequate substitute for the imposition of a much more general obligation on state agencies to prefer lawmaking by rule.

E.

Conclusion: Power of Courts to Require Rulemaking

Prior discussion demonstrates that under various theories and to
various extents, courts may require agencies authorized to engage in
lawmaking by rules as well as by orders to exercise that function by
rulemaking rather than by adjudication in particular circumstances.
While some of the theories discussed are sounder than others, and some
hold greater promise for acceptance by the courts than others, they are
not sufficient, either individually or collectively, to enforce the kind of
general preference for agency lawmaking by rule proposed in part III
of this Article. That is, while these theories are individually and collectively helpful in moving agencies in the direction proposed by part III
of this Article, they will not ensure that, generally, state agencies authorized to make law by rule as well as by order, will do so by
rulemaking as soon as feasible and to the extent practicable. The only
fully satisfactory means with which to ensure such a general preference
for administrative lawmaking by rule, therefore, is legislative.

Note that the "first paragraph is an expression of disapproval with the broad principle
announced in Ford Motor Co." and the third paragraph attempts to ensure that an
agency is "held to the procedural consequences of its choice" between the two modalities of lawmaking. See Berg, supra note 18, at 177.
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LEGISLATIVE SoLUTION

Prior discussion demonstrates that a mandatory preference for
state agency lawmaking by rule that is fully satisfactory may be established only by legislation. Section 2-1 04(3) of the new Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1981 MSAP A) 1M seeks to accomplish this
result. It provides that each agency must, "as soon as feasible and to the
extent practicable, adopt rules . . . embodying appropriate standards,
principles, and procedural safeguards that the agency will apply to the
law it administers." 11111 This broad and general provision attempts to
compel agencies to act as speedily as possible and to go as far as they
reasonably can to structure by rule the procedural and substantive discretion conferred upon them, so as to minimize arbitrary action and
give fair notice to the public. That is, to the extent possible and prudent
under the circumstances, this provision requires agencies initially to
elaborate the major contours of their procedural and substantive discretion by rule rather than by ad hoc adjudicatory order. 1116
The specific language of this 1981 MSAPA provision requires
agencies to issue both rules containing "appropriate . . . procedural
safeguards" and rules containing substantive "standards [and] principles ... that the agency will apply to the law it administers." 1117 This
154. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT (1981), 14 U.L.A. 73 (1987 Supp.)
[hereinafter 1981 MSAPA]. As a Reporter for the 1981 MSAPA, the author of this Article was
responsible for the drafting of § 2-104.
155. /d.
156. An Illinois statute may have a similar purpose. However, poor drafting may interfere
with the accomplishment of that result. The statute provides: "Each rule which implements a
discretionary power to be exercised by an agency shall include the standards by which the agency
shall exercise the power. Such standards shall be stated as precisely and clearly as practicable
under the conditions, to inform fully those persons affected." Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 127, § 1004.02
(1981 ). The difficulty with this statute is that it does not indicate clearly whether agencies are
required, in the first place, to adopt rules to implement their discretionary powers. On its face,
this provision appears applicable only to situations in which agencies have already decided to issue
rules to implement their discretionary powers. It does not appear to require them initially to use
rules rather than ad hoc orders to implement those powers. But this could be a misreading of the
language or intention of this provision. If so, the Illinois statute is the first state law seeking to
impose a mandatory preference for state agency lawmaking by rule. See Escalona v. Board of
Trustees, State Employees Retirement Sys., 127 Ill. App. 3d 357, 469 N.E.2d 297 (1984). As
subsequent discussion in the text will indicate, the MSAPA provision is superior to the Illinois
statute because the former does not contain the same defects as the latter.
A recently enacted Utah statute also may have a similar purpose. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a3(2)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1987) provides that "[i]n addition to other rulemaking required by law, each
agency shall make rules when agency action (a) authorizes, requires, or prohibits an action.
[or] (b) provides or prohibits a material benefit." As subsequent discussion in the text will indicate, the MSAPA provision is superior to this Utah provision in so far as the MSAPA provision
specifically provides that such rulemaking is required only "as soon as feasible and to the extent
practicable."
157. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 154, at 73.
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means that agencies must make a substantial effort to provide, by rule,
procedural protections that are adequate, under the particular circumstances, to protect persons affected by agency action against improper
exercises of agency power. It also requires agencies to make a substantial effort to elaborate, by rule, the substantive standards used in the
application of the laws they administer in order to provide fair notice of
their contents and some assurance that they will be consistently applied.
This model statutory provision is qualified by an express rule of
reason. It only requires agencies to engage in such rulemaking "as soon
as feasible and to the extent practicable." So an agency need only adopt
rules of the enumerated type as quickly as it reasonably can under the
particular circumstances in which it operates. Furthermore, an agency
need only adopt such rules as far as-to the degree-reasonably possible under the particular circumstances in which it operates. This rule
of reason embodying the standards of "feasible" and "practicable" is
more demanding of agencies than the general and unstructured duty to
act in a reasonable manner that is imposed upon them by the typical
state judicial review provision, and less demanding of them than would
be the imposition of an unqualified obligation to issue rules of this
kind.
Many factors must be considered when applying the agency obligation to make the required rules "as soon as feasible and to the extent
practicable." Agencies and courts must consider the individual circumstances of the relevant agency, and the particular circumstances of the
subject matter to which the mandatory rulemaking requirements are to
be applied. And, of course, the factors relating to the timeliness of an
agency's performance of its obligation will be closely related to and intertwined with the factors relating to the detail and precision with
which it must perform that obligation.
The rulemaking obligations imposed by this provision must be
performed in a timely fashion. Agencies must make the required rules
"as soon as feasible." The word "feasible" means "capable of being
done, executed, or effected: possible of realization." 168 It also means
"capable of being utilized ... , or dealt with successfully: suitable." 169
Its synonym is "possible." 160 In determining when an agency, with respect to a particular matter, must make the rules required by the 1981
MSAPA provision, the following factors should be considered: the extent to which the agency had an opportunity to accumulate the neces158. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
831 (1976).
159. /d.
160. /d. See also American Textile Mfrs. lnst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 508-09 (1981 ).
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sary knowledge and experience to resolve the matter by rule in a sound
manner; the extent to which the performance of this rulemaking obligation would have precluded the agency from performing other more important legal obligations; the extent to which related matters or circumstances were not sufficiently settled so as to permit satisfactory
resolution by rule of the issues involved; and the extent to which
greater precision or detail in the agency law was possible in light of the
factors relevant to the sufficiency of its precision and detail, which will
be discussed next. It should be stressed, however, that in considering
these relevant factors, agencies and courts must respect the fact that
rulemaking of the kind required by this model statutory provision must
be executed only "as soon as feasible," which means, as soon as it is
capable of being done under the circumstances.
Agencies are also required by this provision of the MSAPA to
elaborate their law by rule only "to the extent practicable." The word
"practicable" means "possible to practice or perform: capable of being
put into practice, done, or accomplished: feasible. " 161 It also means "capable of being used: usable." 162 Its synonym is also "possible." 163 The
precision and detail with which an agency must make the rules relating to a particular matter should be determined in light of the following
factors: the resources available to the agency for the more detailed and
precise elaboration of its law; the extent to which the formulation and
adoption of more detailed and precise rules would have precluded the
agency from performing other more important legal obligations; the extent to which further detail or precision would impede the achievement
of lawful agency objectives; the extent to which changing circumstances
or existing uncertainties make further elaboration of agency law inconsistent with lawful policies the agency wishes to achieve; the extent to
which the particular questions to be addressed involve so many complex
facts and policy considerations, and are of such a narrow scope, that
their more detailed or specific resolution is unmanageable outside of an
adjudication settling the rights of particular persons on the basis of
their circumstances; the extent to which the agency has been unable to
accumulate sufficient expertise to elaborate its law any further; the extent to which additional detail or precision is necessary to afford affected parties with fair notice and the forseeability of the need for additional detail or precision for this purpose; and the extent to which the
agency had the time, consistent with the timeliness factors noted above,
161.
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to further elaborate its law. It should also be stressed that, in considering these factors, agencies and courts must respect the fact that
rulemaking is required only "to the extent practicable," which means
with as much precision and detail as is capable of being accomplished
under the circumstances.
Prior discussion demonstrates that Section 2-104(3) of the 1981
MSAPA uses the terms "feasible" and "practicable" to mean that
agencies must initially make their law by rule rather than by order as
soon as reasonably possible and as far as reasonably possible in light of
the particular circumstances of the agency and subject matter involved.
This model statutory provision embodies a clear legislative determination that the values of prompt elaboration of agency law by rule and
detailed elaboration of agency law by rule are to be preferred over the
competing general values of agency convenience or agency preference
for ad hoc law making in the course of adjudications. As a result, the
1981 MSAPA provision would fundamentally change existing law in
most states by denying agencies authorized to issue rules and to decide
individual cases plenary discretion to consider, on an entirely equal
footing, lawmaking by rule and lawmaking by order, as alternative
means with which to elaborate their law. Instead, this provision embodies a general direction to agencies mandating a clear preference in favor
of lawmaking by rule, subject to a rule of reason.
Effective enforcement of this statutory preference for initial agency
lawmaking by rule would not appear to be difficult. A reviewing court
could invalidate the application of agency law created ad hoc in the
course of an adjudication whenever the agency was required to make
that law initially in the form of a rule. That is what happened in the
Oregon Megdal case. 164 Such an invalidation of improper retrospective
agency lawmaking by ad hoc adjudicatory order would be an effective
means by which to induce agencies to comply with the requirements of
this model statutory provision. An agency failing in some manner to
perform its obligation, "as soon as feasible and to the extent practicable," to make its law by rule, could not cure its failure retrospectively;
but the agency could do so prospectively by issuing the appropriate
rules it should have issued previously. Those rules would then be applicable, from the time of their effective date, to all those within their
ambit except, perhaps, to the extent particular individuals could
demonstrate that the earlier agency failure to make the rules in question unduly prejudiced them at that later time.
Criticisms of the language of the 1981 MSAPA provision on the
164. See supra text accompanying notes 51-69.
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ground that it is vague do not stand on solid ground. One cannot deny
that the words "as soon as feasible and to the extent practicable" are
vague. But the same may be said about many general requirements
imposed on administrative bodies. Administrative procedure acts, for
example, usually authorize courts to overturn agency action that is "arbitrary," "capricious," or "an abuse of discretion." 165 The effect of such
a delegation of authority to the courts is to impose on agencies an obligation to act in a manner which is certainly vague at the margin. The
desirability of such admittedly vague obligations, however, may best be
assessed by calculating the total benefits they actually achieve in practice and comparing those benefits to the total costs associated with their
everyday implementation - including the costs attributable to the fact
that in some situations agencies will not be clear about the effect of
those requirements on their actions. After engaging in such a comparison, the drafters of the 1981 MSAPA concluded that the total benefits
obtained from agency efforts to comply with that act's mandatory preference for agency lawmaking by rule would substantially exceed the
total costs of those efforts. That judgment seems sound.
While this model statutory provision expresses a generalized legislative preference for rulemaking rather than adjudication as the primary method of agency lawmaking, it also indicates, as noted earlier,
that this preference is not absolute. Case-by-case administrative lawmaking is sanctioned by this provision in circumstances where rulemaking is not yet "feasible" and in relation to matters as to which rulemaking is not "practicable." No agency is omniscient enough to eliminate
every ambiguity in its rules, or to anticipate every question that will
arise in the administration of its programs. There will always be circumstances in which the elaboration of particular details of agency law
by rules will be impracticable, or the issuance, at a particular point in
time, of rules to embody particular agency law, will be infeasible.
Consequently, agencies must continue to make some of their law
on a case-by-case basis in adjudicatory proceedings. However, it is desirable, for the many reasons noted earlier, to ensure that as much
agency law is incorporated in rules as is possible. Therefore, a means
must be found to ensure that agencies incorporate in rules issued at a
later time those principles of law they created initially in the course of
their adjudications. Section 2-104(4) of the 1981 MSAPA seeks to ensure this result. That provision states that "as soon as feasible and to
the extent practicable, [each agency must] adopt rules to supersede
principles of law or policy lawfully declared by the agency as the basis
165. See, e.g., 1961 MSAPA, supra note 19, § 15(g)(6).
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for its decisions in particular cases.mee The practical effect of this proposed statute would be to require agencies engaged in initial lawmaking by ad hoc order under the rule of reason exception contained in
Section 2-104(3), to make a serious subsequent effort to displace that
case law with rules. The reasons for requiring agencies to supersede
with rules, law properly made in the course of their adjudications, include almost all of the reasons advanced earlier in support of a requirement that agencies initially make their law by rule rather than by ad
hoc adjudicatory order.
It should be stressed that this post hoc rulemaking provision only
requires agencies, "as soon as feasible and to the extent practicable,"
to displace with rules, principles of law properly developed in their case
precedent. This rule of reason is identical to the rule of reason contained in Section 2-104(3) of the 1981 MSAPA. Consequently, the discussion of the rule of reason applicable to that provision establishing a
preference for initial agency lawmaking by rule is also fully applicable
to this provision requiring only post hoc rulemaking.
The rules an agency makes to satisfy its post hoc rulemaking obligation need not be wholly congruent with the displaced principles of
law declared by the agency in particular cases. So long as they are both
substantively and procedurally within the authority delegated to the
166. Note that this provision of the 1981 MSAPA was bracketed because the NCCUSL
believed that it would be very controversial. Note also that Wisconsin has a provision in its Administrative Procedure Act stating that "[e]ach agency authorized by law to exercise discretion in
deciding individual cases may formalize the general policies evolving from its decisions by promulgating the policies as rules which the agency shall follow until they are amended or repealed."
Wis. Stat. § 227.11 (2)(c) (1987 Supp.). However, this provision appears to be superfluous because
agencies are virtually always deemed to have implied authority to codify in rules principles of law
that they have lawfully adopted in particular cases. And it does not go as far as the MSAPA
provision because the latter requires agencies to displace by rules, principles of law properly
adopted in individual cases, while the former only authorizes them to do so.
On the other hand, in an apparent effort to emulate the objectives of the MSAPA provision
quoted in the text, Utah recently enacted a statute providing as follows: "Each agency shall enact
rules incorporating the principles of law established by final adjudicative decisions within 90 days
after the decision is announced." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-3(6) (Supp. 1987). This provision
differs from the similar 1981 MSAPA provision in three principal respects. First, the Utah provision imposes an absolute 90 day time limit for post hoc rulemaking in place of the "as soon as
feasible" standard contained in the MSAPA provision. Second, the Utah provision imposes an
absolute requirement for the incorporation in rules of all principles of law established in adjudication while the MSAPA provision requires such post hoc rulemaking only "to the extent practicable." Finally, the Utah provision requires the agency to codify in rules principles of law contained
in final adjudicative decisions, while the MSAPA provision only requires the agency to adopt rules
to "supersede" those principles. The MSAPA provision is clearly superior to the Utah provision.
This is so because, as subsequent discussion in the text will demonstrate, each of the three variances from the MSAPA provision, noted above, is a defect. The three variances from the MSAPA
provision contained in the Utah provision are undesirable because they unduly limit agency discretion and do not take account of the practical realities of day-to-day agency operation.
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agency, the rules required by this provision may codify, be broader or
narrower than, or prospectively overrule, the case law they displace.
The validity of such a rule, therefore, will not depend upon whether
the rule is an accurate codification in all respects of the agency case law
it replaces. As long as the agency acts in a manner consistent with its
authorizing legislation and with required rulemaking procedures, the
agency may simply adopt that earlier case law as a rule without substantive alteration, adopt it with minor or substantial alterations, or
repudiate for the future all or a portion of that law. The 1981 MSAPA
provision only requires that, "as soon as feasible and to the extent practicable," an agency must engage in a rulemaking proceeding to consider
and adopt a rule governing those subjects as to which it has developed
discernible law in adjudications.
An agency that breaches its duty to displace a line of case precedent with a rule may not subsequently rely on that line of precedent.
Instead, the agency must readjudicate wholly de novo whatever principles of law might apply to the particular circumstances covered by that
earlier case law. Of course, this remedy may not be particularly effective in practice. In subsequent adjudication, the agency might adopt and
apply the same principle of law embedded in the prior precedent upon
which the agency could no longer lawfully rely, without actually reconsidering the underlying issues on their merits. Courts enforcing such a
post hoc rulemaking requirement will have to be vigilant to ensure that
agencies fully and fairly reconsider the propriety and desirability of
prior agency case law in such circumstances rather than only appear to
do so. That will not be an easy task and it will be laden with difficulties. Admittedly, the absence of a fully effective mechanism with which
to ensure agency compliance with this post hoc rulemaking requirement
is a problem. However, even if this provision is not, in every instance,
effectively enforceable in the courts, it is desirable in order to communicate community expectations to the agencies and to facilitate the evaluation of agency performance by the legislature and the public at large.
This post hoc rulemaking requirement may also be criticized as
being excessively vague. "How generally applicable must an adjudicatory determination be in order to constitute a 'principle of law or policy' " that must be displaced by a rule ?167 Where, between the extremes of an adjudicatory decision deciding the law applicable to a
particular case in only the very narrowest, fact specific terms, and an
adjudicatory decision announcing its decision on the basis of a legal
principle with potentially broad stare decisis consequences, does a prin167. Scalia, supra note 43, at 25, 28.
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ciple of law emerge that must be displaced by a rule pursuant to the
requirements of this statutory provision? There is an answer to this
question.
The displacement of agency case law by rules is required by this
provision only "as soon as feasible and to the extent practicable." Practicability will require that a particular agency elaboration of law in an
adjudication extend beyond the facts of the specific case in which that
law originates before it must be embodied in a rule. This means that a
principle of law declared in an agency adjudication must, in practical
effect, be of potential general applicability before its displacement by a
rule is required. The extent to which a principle of law declared as the
basis for a particular adjudication is of potential general applicability
may be ascertained from the text of the agency decision, and the nature
of the particular facts and determinations involved in that case.
On the one hand, it is clear that an agency with an identifiable
line of decisions based upon a particular principle of law must displace
that principle with a rule "as soon as feasible and to the extent practicable." On the other hand, it is clear that an agency need not engage in
any rulemaking if it only issues a single decision on a subject, and that
decision appears to rest only on the peculiar or unusual circumstances
of that particular case rather than on some discernible principle of
more general applicability. Of course, even where there is only a single
decision on a subject, that decision may be decided in such a way as to
make clear that it rests on a principle broader than its unique circumstances, thus making the requirements of this post hoc rulemaking requirement fully applicable. So, this provision will require some judgments by agencies. And a reviewing court will uphold those judgments
unless they constitute a clear abuse of discretion. To demonstrate such
a clear abuse of discretion and overcome the presumption of agency
regularity, a party will either have to demonstrate a pattern of agency
decisions on a particular subject clearly establishing an agency default
in its duties under this provision, or show that a single agency decision
on a particular subject is written, or has been treated by the agency, in
such a way as to indicate clearly its potential general applicability.
In the end, one must admit that the requirement imposed by Section 2-1 04( 4) of the 1981 MSAPA is vague at its periphery. But so are
many other general requirements imposed on agencies; and this requirement is no more vague than many other general requirements imposed on agencies for which there is broad support in our body politic.
For example, as noted earlier, administrative procedure acts generally
authorize courts to overturn agency action that is "arbitrary," "capricious," or an "abuse of discretion." Yet the obligations imposed on
agencies by this delegation of authority to the courts are vague at the
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margin and, therefore, are not without cost on that basis. Nevertheless,
there is a general agreement that these impositions on agencies are valuable tools with which to assure lawful and responsible agency action.
The same may be said about the requirements embodied in the 1981
MSAPA post hoc rulemaking provision. The total benefits flowing
from conscientious efforts to apply that provision are likely to outweigh
substantially the total costs incurred in the course of those efforts.
This is so even though the "sheer magnitude of the task [hence
cost] of such codification" of agency case law in rules may be great. 168
Our society decided, long ago, that those subject to the law are entitled
to fair notice of its contents, and that the public and its politically responsible officials should have an effective opportunity to monitor, and
to participate in, its creation. To accomplish these important objectives
we have been willing to assume all reasonable costs. There is no evidence that the costs of formally displacing agency case law with rules in
the manner contemplated by this provision would be especially large or
disproportionate to the benefits gained from such action. Agencies already informally codify many of their adjudicatory decisions for internal staff use even if they do not follow the rulemaking process when
they do so, or make the product generally available to the public at
large. How else can agencies educate their own staffs about the law
they are to apply, and assure that in practice their staffs follow all
applicable agency law? To that extent, the additional costs imposed by
the displacement of agency case law by rules, "as soon as feasible and
to the extent practicable," are likely to be much smaller than opponents
might otherwise suggest.
The 1981 MSAPA post hoc rulemaking requirement has been
criticized on the ground that it creates an unacceptable dilemma with
respect to the fairness of agency lawmaking. "If the subsequent
rulemaking [displacing agency case law] regularly endorses the holdings
of earlier adjudications, they will rightly be regarded as charades.mss
On the other hand, if "they often reverse (for the future) those holdings
- which have been the basis for particularized commands or even penalties in the past - then the adjudicatory process is bound to fall into
deserved disrepute. " 170
This criticism does not withstand analysis. It is true that in the
rulemaking proceedings to displace agency law created in adjudications,
agencies may, within the scope of their delegated authority, either codify that law in the rule finally adopted, reject it as being unsound, or
168. /d.
169. !d.
170. /d.

161]

AGENCY LAWMAKING BY RULE

215

modify It m some way. But surely this is not an unusual situation.
From time-to-time, legislatures as well as agencies have codified, in
ways that are simply declaratory of the preexisting law, common law
principles as well as principles embedded in agency case law. So, too,
legislatures by statute, as well as agencies by rule, have altered or abolished principles embedded in the common law or in agency case law. It
seems indefensible to argue that these positive law confirmations, modifications, or repudiations of prior case law principles are unacceptable
when they occur as part of an institutionalized process that requires
agencies to reconsider the propriety of the law they create in the course
of adjudications. When a legislature requires a reconsideration of
agency case law, it expressly sanctions such agency action and the subsequent displacement of that agency case law by agency rules. In addition, the process of agency reconsideration in a rulemaking proceeding
of principles of law established in its own cases is more democratic,
more politically responsible, and more visible, than the more closed adjudication processes that initially created that law. Had the legislature
itself accomplished the identical reconsideration by statute, no one could
reasonably complain that anything unseemly or harmful had occurred.
It is hard to see how that conclusion is altered when the legislature,
instead, orders an agency to engage in such a reconsideration subject to
procedures that would make its action highly visible, responsive to the
public and to politically accountable officials, and consistent with the
need for fully informed decisionmaking.
The post hoc rulemaking requirement contained in Section 2104( 4) of the 1981 MSAP A embodies a fair compromise between the
practical need of agencies to continue making some of their law by adjudication, and the practical need of the public and their politically accountable surrogates to have agencies make as much of their law as is
reasonably possible by rule. The provision is surely not perfect; there is
merit in the vagueness charge and there will be some difficulty in ensuring the provision's full enforcement. On balance, however, this post
hoc rulemaking requirement is a substantial advance in the existing
law on this subject, and a reasonable effort to reconcile some important
competing values.
A final but important point should be made about both the 1981
MSAPA provision requiring agencies initially to make their law by
rule rather than by order, and the 1981 MSAPA provision requiring
agencies to engage in post hoc rulemaking to displace principles of law
properly adopted by ad hoc adjudication. The burden of persuasion
will be on those who wish to challenge, in a court, an agency decision
to proceed initially by order rather than by rule to elaborate its law on
a particular subject, or an agency failure to displace by rules specified
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principles of law properly declared in its adjudications. Persons challenging such agency action will have to convince the reviewing court
that rulemaking by the agency was feasible at the time in question and
practicable with respect to the matter in question. A combination of the
usual presumption of administrative regularity 171 and the express principle of reason that modifies the requirements of these two provisions,
will ensure that agencies subject to these provisions will retain some
latitude within which they may use adjudication for lawmaking. But
they will no longer be able to treat rulemaking and adjudication as
fungible means of lawmaking. Instead, they will have to rely upon
rulemaking in all situations where they do not have a really strong
justification for engaging in lawmaking by ad hoc order.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Most states have uncritically followed federal law by allowing
state agencies authorized to issue rules and to decide individual cases to
elaborate their law either by rule or by order. The only limitations
imposed by these states on their agencies' choice of lawmaking modality
are a general duty to act reasonably, and a duty to follow any specific
statutory commands applicable to particular situations. As a result,
most states have vested their agencies with a very broad discretion in
choosing the means by which they will exercise their delegated lawmaking functions. This is unfortunate. Previous discussion demonstrates that state agencies should generally be required, "as soon as feasible and to the extent practicable," to make their law initially by rule
rather than by ad hoc order. A number of important differences between the state and federal administrative processes were highlighted to
demonstrate that such a broad-scoped rulemaking preference is more
urgent for state administrative lawmaking than for federal administrative lawmaking.
A clear and binding general preference for initial state agency
lawmaking by rule rather than by ad hoc order is desirable because of
the overwhelming advantages of the former in most situations. Almost
all of the advantages of rulemaking suggest that it would also be desirable to require post hoc rulemaking by agencies in situations where they
must initially make law by order. So long as these requirements are
subject to a principle of reason, they are likely to be consistent with the
practical need to operate state agencies efficiently, effectively, and economically. It seems clear that the many advantages of such a
171. Recall the usual presumption of agency regularity. See sources cited supra note 131.
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mandatory preference for state administrative rulemaking far outweigh
its disadvantages.
This Article has demonstrated that the courts in a few states have
attempted to create a binding preference for administrative lawmaking
by rule in the absence of explicit statutory authority. While these efforts have been helpful, their impact has been relatively limited because
only a handful of states are involved; the circumstances in which these
courts have required rulemaking have been narrowly defined; and the
legal justification for these judicially imposed requirements has sometimes been unclear or even dubious. Nevertheless, the Oregon courts
have provided a potential basis for a relatively broad-scoped, judicially
imposed preference for administrative lawmaking by rule. In the absence of a statutory solution, its efforts are worthy of emulation by
other state courts because they appear to be both legitimate and consistent with sound public policy.
Nevertheless, it is clear that legislation is the best means by which
to ensure a generally applicable, broad-scoped preference for state
agency lawmaking by rule. In each state, a statute requiring agencies,
"as soon as feasible and to the extent practicable," to elaborate their
law by rule rather than by ad hoc order, in the absence of specific
legislation to the contrary, would be desirable. This statute should be
supplemented by a statute requiring agencies, "as soon as feasible and
to the extent practicable," to displace with rules principles of law properly adopted by them in particular cases. Together, these provisions
would ensure that state agencies authorized to make rules and to decide
individual cases would elaborate the major contours of their law by
rule, and would resort to lawmaking by adjudication only when
rulemaking was disfunctional or unrealistic in the particular circumstances. Agencies would no longer be able to choose freely to make their
law wholly or primarily by ad hoc order.
The benefits that would flow from increased state agency lawmaking by rule and decreased state agency lawmaking by order are likely to
be considerable. They are likely to include enhanced agency attentiveness to the wishes of the general public, greater agency accountability
to the governor and legislature, increased visibility for the contents of
agency law, decreased opportunities for arbitrary agency action, increased agency efficiency, and better quality agency decisionmaking.
There are undoubtedly costs in imposing such a mandatory general
preference for rulemaking on state agencies; but the benefits that are
likely to flow from such a requirement appear to exceed those costs by
a substantial amount.

